S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII.

De invisibili Spiritus sancti missione.

PARS II.
Magister ponit opinionis sua defensionem.
ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 307-310.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Hic quaeritur, si caritas Spiritus sanctus est, cum ipsa augeatur.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de missione Spiritus sancti invisibili secundum suam opinionem. Hic *secundo* ponit opinionis suae defensionem, et hoc facit respondendo obiectionibus, quae possent[1] suam opinionem improbare. Et quoniam sua positio improbari potest et *ratione* et *auctoritate* et *utroque modo*, ideo habet haec pars tres partes.

In *prima* parte impugnat et improbat hoc quod dixerat, quod Spiritus sanctus est caritas, qua diligimus Deum et proximum.

Secundo vero, per auctoritatem, ibi: *Supra dictum est, quod Spiritus sanctus*.

Tertio, per auctoritates et rationes, ibi: *Alias quoque inducunt* etc. — Prima ratio contra Magistrum sumta est ex hoc, quod

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVII

On the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit.
PART II
Master (Peter) puts forth the defense of his own opinion.
ARTICLE SOLE

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 307-310.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Here there is asked, 'if charity is the Holy Spirit, since it is increased etc..

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Above Master (Peter) dealt with the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit according to his own opinion. Here *secondly* he puts forth the defense of his own opinion, and does this by responding to the objections, which could[1] disprove his own opinion.. And since his own position can be disproved both *by reason* and *by authority* and *last in both ways* [utroque modo], for that reason this part has three parts.

In the *first* part he impugns and disproves this which he had said, that the Holy Spirit is the Charity, by which we love God and neighbor.

However, *second*, through authority, there (where he says): *Above it has been said, that the Holy Spirit* etc.

Third, through authorities and reasons, there (where he says): *The also bring forward other* etc.. — The first reason

caritas augetur;[2] secunda ratio contra ipsum sumta est ex hoc, quod caritas est a Spiritu sancto, sicut dicit Augustinus; tertia ratio sumta est ab hoc, quod caritas est animi affectio, et hoc quidem rationi et auctoritate consonat. In qualibet autem istarum partium Magister primo opponit et secundo determinat; et partes manifestae sunt.

against Master (Peter) has been taken out of this, that charity is increased;[2] the second reason against him has been taken out of this, that charity is from the Holy Spirit, just as (St.) Augustine says; the third reason has been taken from this, that charity is an affection of the soul, and this indeed is consonant with reason and authority. But in each of these parts Master (Peter) first opposes and second determines; and (thus) the parts have been manifested.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis est hic[3] quaestio de augmento caritas, et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.

Primo quaeritur, utrum caritas possit augeri secundum substantiam.

Secundo quaeritur de modo augmenti ipsius caritatis.

Tertio quaeritur de opposito augmenti ipsius, scilicet de diminuatione, utrum caritas possit diminui.

Quarto de augmento caritatis quantum ad terminum sive[4] statum.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

For an understanding of this part, there is here[3] the question of the augment of charity, and about this four (things) are asked.

First, there is asked, whether charity can be increased according to substance.

Second, there is asked concerning the augment itself of charity.

Third, there is asked concerning the opposite of its augment, that is, concerning (its) diminution, whether chary can be diminished.

Fourth, of the augment of charity as much as regards (its) terminus or[4] state.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

De augmento caritatis.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum caritas secundum substantiam augeri possit.

ARTICLE SOLE

On the augment of charity.

QUESTION 1

Whether charity can be increased according to substance.

Q**UANTUM AD PRIMUM** ostenditur, quod caritas possit augeri secundum substantiam:

1. Per Augustinum ad Bonifacium:[5] « Caritas meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur perfici ».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*: caritas viae secundum substantiam minor est caritate patriae; sed a caritate viae ad caritatem patriae contingit devenire, ipsa salvata in esse, quoniam *caritas* viae *nunquam excidit*;[6] sed motus a minori ad maius, re salva, est augmentum:[7] ergo contingit caritatem augmentari.

3. Item, constat, quod diversis maiora et minora . . .

A**S MUCH AS REGARDS THE FIRST** it is shown, that charity can be increased according to substance.

1. Through (St.) Augustine (in his letter) to Boniface:[5] « Charity merits to be increased, as what is enacted [aucta] merits to be perfected ».

2. Likewise, this same [hoc ipsum] seems from *reason*: the charity of the wayfarer [viae] according to substance is less than the charity of the Fatherland; but a movement from the lesser to the greater, within the same being [re salva], is an augment:[7] therefore it happens that charity is augmented.

3. Likewise, it is established, that to diverse (persons) greater and / lesser rewards . . .

[1] Plurimis codd. cum ed. 1 reluctantibus, Vat. *possunt*.
[2] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *augeatur*.
[3] Plurimis mss. et ed. 1 consentientibus, supplevimus *hic*.
[4] Vat. cum cod. cc repetit *ad*.
[5] Epist. 189. n. 2. secundum sensum, sed verbotenus Epist. 186. ad Paulinum c. 3. n. 10. In hoc textu ed. 1 cum uno alterove codice ut I post *mereatur* addit *et*.
[6] I. Cor. 13, 8.
[7] Aristot., I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 33. (c. 5.).

[1] With very many codices together with edition 1 striving against it, the Vatican edition has *can* [possunt].
[2] The Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, has *may be increased* [augeatur].
[3] With the agreement of very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied the *here* [hic].
[4] The Vatican edition together with codex cc repeats *as regards* [ad].
[5] Epistle 189, n. 2, according to its sense, but word for word from Epistle 186, "To Paulinus", ch 3, n. 10. In this text edition 1 together with one or the other codex, such as I, after *merits* [mereatur] adds *also* [et].
[6] 1 Cor. 13:8.
[7] Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I., text 33 (chapter 5).

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praemia dabuntur; unde Apostolus, primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto:[1] *Alia claritas solis, alia claritas lunae* etc.; et constat, quod uni et eidem secundum diversos status debetur diversum praemium, scilicet maius et minus; sed magnitudo praemii substantialis respondet quantitati caritatis, non secundum fervorum, sed secundum substantiam: ergo si contingit, maius praemium alicui deberi, ergo et caritatem substantialiter augeri.

lesser rewards are given; whence the Apostle, in the fifteenth (chapter) of the First (Letter) to the Corinthians (says):[1] *One the clarity of the Sun, another the clarity of the Moon* etc.; and it is established, that for one and the same according to diverse states there ought (to be) a diverse reward, that is greater and lesser; but the magnitude of the substantial reward responds to the quantity of charity, non according to fervor, but according to substance: therefore if it happens, that a greater reward is owed to someone, therefore also that charity be increased substantially.

4. Item, contingit caritatem meliorari, cum non sit summum bonum; sed caritas est bona substantialiter: ergo contingit, caritatem secundum suam substantiam fieri meliorem. Sed ut dicit Augustinus in sexto de Trinitate, octavo capitulo:[2] « In spiritualibus idem est maius et melius »: ergo cum caritas sit quid spirituale, possibile est, secundum substantiam ipsam effici maiorem.

4. Likewise, it happens that charity is becomes better [meliori], since it is not the most high Good; but charity is a good substantially: therefore it happens, that charity according to its own substance is made better [fieri meliorem]. But as (St.) Augustine says in the sixth (book) On the Trinity, in the eight chapter:[2] « In spiritual (things) greater and better are the same »: therefore since charity is something spiritual, it is possible, that according to substance it become greater.

5. Item, constat quod in uno et eodem caritas potest in maiorem effectum et actum: ergo cum maioritas effectus veniat a magnitudine virtutis, possibile est, caritatem maiorem effici secundum virtutem. Tunc quaero: aut caritas est sua virtus, aut non: si *sic*: ergo augmentata virtute, necesse est, augeri essentiam caritatis; si *non*, tunc quaero de illa virtute:

5. Likewise, it is established that in one and same (thing) charity can be unto a greater effect and act: therefore since greater-ness of an effect comes from the magnitude of the virtue, it is possible, that charity become greater according to virtue. Then I ask. either charity is its own virtue, or not: if *it is*: therefore with the virtue augmented, it is necessary, that the essence of charity

aut habet essentiam, aut non; si *sic*, similiter quaero de illa: ergo vel erit abire in infinitum, vel necesse est poni, quod aliquid augeatur secundum substantiam; sed qua ratione alia virtus, et caritas.

be increased; if *not*, then I ask of that virtue: either it has an essence, or not; if *it does*, similarly I ask of it: therefore either there will be an infinite regress [abire in infinitum], and/or it is necessary to posit, that something is increased according to substance; but by that reckoning whereby another virtue (is increased), (so) also charity.

Sed contra: 1. Caritas est forma; sed omnis forma consistit in essentia invariabili:[3] ergo et caritas; sed nihil invariabile secundum essentiam augetur secundum essentiam: ergo nec caritas.

2. Item, ubi augmentum, ibi maius et minus;[4] sed ubi est simplicitas, ibi non est maius et minus: si ergo caritas forma simplex et non extensa, in caritate non erit augmentum.

3. Item, augmentum in corporalibus est secundum accidens, et non secundum substantiam:[5] ergo pari ratione et in spiritualibus: ergo si caritas augetur, hoc est solum secundum accidens, non secundum substantiam.

4. Item, quod augetur mutatur,[6] et quod augetur secundum substantiam mutatur secundum substantiam; sed quod substantialiter mutatur est aliud nunc quam prius: ergo quod augetur secundum substantiam non manet: si ergo *caritas nunquam excidit*[7] nisi per peccatum, et semper manet, ergo non augetur.

But on the contrary: 1. Charity is a form; but every form consists in an invariable essence:[3] therefore also charity; but nothing invariable according to essence is increased according to essence: therefore neither charity.

2. Likewise, where (there is) augment, there a greater and a lesser;[4] but where there is simplicity, there is no greater or lesser: if, therefore, charity is a simple form and not extended, there will be no augment in charity.

3. Likewise, an augment in corporal (things) is according to accident, and not according to substance:[5] therefore for an equal reason also in spiritual ones: therefore if charity is increased, this is only according to accident, not according to substance.

4. Likewise, that which is increased is changed,[6] and that which is increased according to substance is changed according to substance; but what is substantially changed is now other than before: therefore what is increased according to substance does not remain: if, therefore, *charity never passes away* [excidit][7] except through sin, and always remains, therefore it is not increased.

CONCLUSIO.

Caritas secundum substantiam sive secundum quantitatem virtutis augeri potest.

CONCLUSION

Charity can be increased according to substance or according to quantity of virtue.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum communem opinionem verum est, caritatem substantialiter augeri.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum distinguunt quidam augmentum secundum duplicem differentiam. Augmentum enim est, quando minori succedit maius; hoc autem potest esse dupliciter: vel *ita*, quod illud idem, quod prius fuit minus, postea fiat *maius*, sicut homo dicitur augeri vel aliquod *aliud* quantum, et hoc modo[8] caritas non

I respond: It must be said, that according to the common opinion it is true, that charity can be substantially increased.

For an understanding, moreover, of the objections certain (authors) distinguish augment according to a twofold difference. For an augment is, when a greater succeeds a lesser; but this can be in a twofold manner: either *such*, that that same, which was before lesser, afterwards is made *greater*, just as a man is said to increase

augetur, ut dicunt; vel *ideo*, quod minori succedat maius, non idem numero, sed consimile in forma, sicut dies dicuntur augeri, non quia idem dies primo[9] sit minor; sic dicunt augeri caritatem, ac per hoc posse evadere oppositiones.

Sed positio ista, ut supra probatum est,[10] non potest stare. Ostensum est enim, quod caritate manente eadem, contingit, circa eandem fieri crementum et perfectionem.

Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod augmentum sequitur quantitatem. Quantitas autem dicitur dupliciter, scilicet *proprie* et *metaphorice*: proprie dicitur quantitas *molis*, et haec est in corporalibus; metaphorice quantitas *virtutis*, et haec est[11] in spiritualibus. Sic et augmentum dicitur dupliciter: *proprie*, scilicet secundum magnitudinem *molis*, et *metaphorice* secundum quantitatem virtutis. Cum ergo in caritate sit quantitas virtutis, et non in summo, constans est, caritatem augeri posse. *Rursus*, cum virtus sit idem quod substantia caritatis, et sit[12] quantitas virtutis, hinc est, quod de necessitate sequitur, caritatem augeri secundum substantiam; cum enim sit virtus, eius substantia non est alia a virtute.

and/or any *other* quantum, and in this manner[8] charity is not increased, as they say; and/or *for this reason*, that the greater succeeds the lesser, not the same according to number, but completely similar in form, just as they say the day is increasing, not because the same day is at first[9] lesser; thus they say that charity is increased, ac through this (it is) that one is able to avoid the oppositions.

But this position of theirs, as has been proved above,[10] cannot stand. For it has been shown, that with charity remaining the same there comes to be an increment [crementum] and a perfection.

And for that reason it must be said in another manner, that augment follows quantity. Moreover, “quantity” is said in a twofold manner, namely *properly* and *metaphorically*: properly “quantity” is said of a mass [molis], and this is in corporals; metaphorically “quantity” (is said) of virtue, and this is[11] in spirituals. In the same manner also “augment” is said in a twofold manner: *properly*, namely according to the magnitude of *a mass*, and *metaphorically* according to the quantity of a virtue. Therefore since in charity there is a quantity of virtue, and not in the greatest degree [in summo], it is established, that charity can be increased. *Again*, since the virtue is the same (thing) which the substance of charity (is), and (since) a quantity belongs[12] to the virtue, hence it is, that of necessity it follows, that charity is increased according to substance; for since it is a virtue, its substance is not other than a virtue.

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[1] Vers. 41.
[2] Num. 9: In his enim, quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse, quod est melius esse. — Mox cod. I *unde* pro *ergo*.
[3] Libr. de Sex princip., qui est Gilberti Porretani: Ratio sive forma est id quod supervenit composito, simplici constans et invariabili essentia. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 28. et VIII. text. 10. (VI. c. 8. in fine, et VII. c. 3.). In primo loco cit. ait: « Indivisibilis namque forma est »; in secundo comparat substantiam (essentiam) numeris, in quibus quaelibet additio vel diminutio inducit mutationem specificam. — Mox post *invariabile* codd. K V omittit *secundum essentiam*, dein nomini *essentiam* praemittunt *substantiam vel*.
[4] Aristot., I de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 31. seqq. (c. 5).
[5] Cfr. Aristot., I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 30. seqq. (c. 5.) et V. Phys. text. 7-20. (c. 2. et 3.). — Mox in

[1] Verse 41.
[2] Number 9: For among these, which are not great in mass, being greater is that, which being better is. — Next codex I has *wherefore* [unde] for *therefore* [ergo].
[3] The Book on the Six Principles, which belongs to Gilbert of Porretain: A reason or form is that which comes upon the composite, (and is) constant by a simply and invariable essence. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text. 28, and Bk. VIII, text 10 (Bk. VI, ch. 8 at the end, and Bk. VII, ch. 3). In the first passage cited, he says: « For it is an invisible form »; in the second he compares a substance (essence) to the numbers, in which any addition and/or diminution induces a specific change. — Next after *invariable* [invariabile] codices K and V omit *according to essence* [secundum essentiam], then to the noun *essence* [essentiam] they preface *substance and/or* [substantiam vel].

Vat. et cod. cc minus apte, et aliis codd. cum ed. 1 obnitentibus, omittitur *solum*.
[6] Vide Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.) et VIII. Phys. text. 55 (c. 7.).
[7] I. Cor. 13, 8.
[8] Cod. X, variata interpunctione et positione, *vel aliquid aliud, et quantum ad hoc caritas*, cum quo concordat cod. R, qui tamen omittit particulam *et* ac ponit *ad hunc modum* pro *ad hoc*. Paulo infra codd. P Q *ita* loco *ideo*; ac dein fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus voci *numero* praefixum particulam *in*.
[9] Cod. T *prius* loco *primo*, et cod. K *possit esse* pro *sit*.
[10] Hic, in fundamentis, praesertim in ultimo.
[11] E vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *est*.
[12] Plures codd. ut A G I S T W X Y dd ff omittunt *sit*, quod alii ut H cc cum ed. 1 transponunt post *quantitas*. Codd. L O Z paulo ante post *virtus* addunt *caritas*, quod vel supplendum est, vel nomen *virtus* referendum ad sequens *caritatis*; dein codd. L O *et quantitas virtutis, quod quantitas substantiae* substituunt loco *et sit quantitas virtutis*. Quomodo hoc argumentum intelligendum, accipe ex fundam. 5. supra posito, et infra ex resp. ad 3. Mox aliqui codd. ut D V X bb minus apte omittunt *enim*, loco cuius cod. G habet *ipsa*; cod. T deinde post *virtus* adiungit *necessario sequitur, quod*.

[4] Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 31 ff. (ch. 5).
[5] Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 30 ff. (ch. 5), and Physics, Bk. V, texts 7-20 (chs. 2 and 3). — Next in the Vatican edition and in codex cc less aptly, and with the other codices together with edition 1 striving against this, there is omitted *only* [solum].
[6] See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. IV, text 32 (ch. 4) and Bk. VIII, text 55 (ch. 7).
[7] 1 Cor. 13, 8.
[8] Codex X, having varied the punctuation and position (of the words), reads *and/or anything else, and as much as regards this, charity* [vel aliquid aliud, et quantum ad hoc caritas], with which codex R agrees, which however omits the particle *and* [et] and puts *regards this manner* [ad hunc modum] for *regards this* [ad hoc]. A little below this codices P and Q have *thus* [ita] in place of *for that reason* [ideo]; and then, trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged the particle *in* [in] prefixed to the word *number* [numero].
[9] Codex T has *the same, prior day is lesser* [idem dies prius sit minor], and codex K has *can be* [possit esse] for *is* [sit].
[10] Here, in the fundamenta, especially in n. 5.
[11] From the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied *is* [est].
[12] Very many codices, such as A G I S T W X Y dd and ff read *which the substance of charity and the quantity of the virtue (are)* [quod substantia caritatis, et quantitas virtutis]; the others, such as H and cc, together with edition 1 read similarly, but have *is* [sit] for the *(are)*. Codices L O and Z, a little before this, after *virtue* [virtus] adds *"charity"* [caritas], which either must be supplied, and/or the noun *virtue* [virtus] must refer to the following *of charity* [caritatis]; then codices L and O substitute *and the quantity of virtue, (the same) which the quantity of substance (is)* [et quantitas virtutis, quod quantitas substantiae] for *and (since) quantity belongs to the virtue* [et sit quantitas virtutis]. The manner in which this argument is to be understood, is taken from fundament n. 5, posited above, and below from the response to n. 3. Then some codices, such as D V X and bb, less aptly omits *for* [enim], in place of which codex G has (an explicit subject) *it itself* [ipsa]; codex T then after *virtue* [virtus] inserts *it necessarily follows, that* [necessario sequitur, quod].

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1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod essentia formae est invariabilis; dicendum, quod verum est de forma universali; si autem dicatur de forma singulari, verum est in se considerata, sed non prout in alio.[1]

1. To that, therefore, which is objected in the contrary, that the essence of a form is invariable; it must be said, that it is true of a universal form, but if it be said of a singular form, it is true considered in itself, but not insofar as in the other.[1]

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplicitas non admittit magnitudinem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod non admittit

2. To that which is objected, that simplicity does not admit magnitude; it must be said, that it is true, because it does not admit a

magnitudinem molis, admittit tamen magnitudinem virtutis.

magnitude of mass, however it does admit a magnitude of virtue.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod augmentum[2] in corporalibus est motus secundum accidens, patet responsio. Nam quantitas *molis* est accidens, essentialiter differens a quanto; non autem sic est in quantis quantitate *virtutis*, immo quantitas virtutis essentialis est, ut in opponendo probatum est.[3]

3. To that which is objected, that an augment[2] in corporal (things) is a movement according to accident, the response is clear. For a quantity of *mass* is an accident, essentially differing by a quantum; but not so is it among quanta according to the quantity of *virtue*, nay a quantity of virtue is essential, as has been proven by the opposing argument [in opponendo].[3]

Potest tamen dici, quod cum dicitur, quod[4] motus augmenti in corporalibus est motus secundum accidens, dupliciter potest accipi hoc quod est *secundum*: aut quod dicat habitudinem termini *per se* sive termini formalis, et sic utique terminus augmenti est quantitas perfecta; aut ita, quod dicat terminum *per accidens*, et hoc modo augmentum per accidens[5] respicit substantiam. Quod patet. Cum enim additur quantitas maior minori, nisi fiat per rarefactionem vel per protensionem,[6] oportet quod addatur substantia, in qua sit illa quantitas, et ita per consequens ad substantiam terminatur etiam in corporalibus.

However, it can be said, that when there is said, that[4] the movement of increase [motus augmenti] in corporals is a movement according to accident, that which it is "*according to*" can be accepted in a twofold manner: either (according to) which it means a habitude of a terminus per se or of a formal terminus, and thus indeed the terminus of an increase is a perfect quantity, or thus, (according to) which it means a terminus per accidens, and in this manner an augment per accidens[4] looks back to the substance. Which is clear. For when there is added a greater quantity to a lesser, unless it comes to be through a rarefaction and/or through a being-stretched-out [protensionem],[6] it is bound that it be added according to the substance, in which that quantity is, and thus consequently it is terminated at the substance even in corporal (things).

4. Et per hoc patet quod obiicitur: quod mutatur secundum substantiam est aliud et aliud;[7] verum est, si dicat terminum formalem; sed non sic dicit.

4. And through this what is objected is clear: 'what is changed according to substance is now one thing now another [aliud et aliud]';[7] it is true, if it means a formal terminus, but (the Apostle) does not mean (it) in this manner.

Ad illud quod obiicitur: quo augmentatur secundum substantiam et mutatur secundum substantiam; dicendum, quia[8] rei non tantum est esse substantiale, sed etiam perfectum esse. Mutari ergo secundum hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel respectu *esse simpliciter*, et sic mutatum est aliud et aliud; vel respectu *esse perfecti*, et sic est idem,[9] quia cum de imperfecto fit perfectum, non est aliud, sed idem. Hinc est, quod caritas, quamvis substantialier augeatur, non est alia, sed eadem secundum substanitam; unde non valet obiectio.

To that which is objected: 'by that by which it is augmented according to substance, it is also changed according to substance'; it must be said, that[8] to a thing not only does it belongs to be substantial, but also to be perfect [perfectum esse]. Therefore 'to be changed according to this' can be in a twofold manner: either in respect to '*being*' *simply*, and thus the changed is now one thing now another; and/or in respect to '*being perfected*' [esse perfecti], and thus it is the same,[9] because when the perfect comes to be from the imperfect, it is not another (thing), but the same one. Hence it is, that charity, although it is substantially

increased, is not other, but the same according to substance; whence the objection is not valid.

SCHOLION.

I. Cum sententia communi quaestio resolvitur affirmative. Deinde circa *modum* huius argumenti S. Doctor affert opinionem aliquorum insufficientem; denique propriam suam sententiam proponit eamque probat adhibito isto axiomate, quod augmentum sequitur quantitatem. Quantitas autem communiter distinguitur in propriam sive molis, et metaphoriam sive virtutis; unde sequitur, quod etiam duplex augmentatio admitti debeat, et inde, quod caritas augeri possit, et quod augmentatio fiat secundum essentiam. — Ut rationes et difficultates ad philosophiam spectantes, quae in hac et seq. quaest. tanguntur, facilius intelligantur, iuvat aliqua excerpere circa varias in antiquis scholis vigentes opiniones de augmento et diminnutione formarum. Teste Boethio, (III. in Categorias seu Praedicamenta Aristotelis, c. de Qualitate) tres opiniones iam apud antiquos philosophos extiterunt de *intensione formarum* seu de magis et minus. « Quidam namque dicebant, in omnibus secundum *materiae habitudinem* reperiri posse magis et minus. Proprium namque esse materiae corporumque intensione crecere et minui relaxatione, quae quorundam Platonicorum sententia fuit ». Quae Boethii verba a B. Alberto, tract. 8. c. 1 ita exponuntur: « Eorum quidem *una* (opinio), qui dicebant, quod in omni, in quo invenitur magis et minus, invenitur aliquo modo materia, cuius quantitas, ut dicunt, ex indivisibilibus consistit: ubi plura similia in uno conveniunt, id dicunt intendi, et ubi pauciora sunt, illud dicunt remitti, et ideo albissima sunt in quibus plura indivisibilia concurrunt albedinis; remitti autem, ubi conveniunt pauciora. Et haec quidem opinio, ut dicit Boethius, fuit Pla- /- tonis.

SCHOLIUM

I. The question is resolved in the affirmative with the common sentence. Then about the *manner* of this argument the Seraphic Doctor mentions [affert] the insufficient opinion of some (authors); then proposes his own and proves it, having employed this axiom, that augment follows quantity. Moreover quantity is commonly distinguished into proper or (one) of mass, and metaphoric or (one) of virtue; whence it follows, that there ought to be admitted also a twofold augmentation; and hence, that charity can be increased, and that augmentation comes to be according to essence. — So that the reasons and difficulties pertaining to Philosophy, which in this and the following question are touched upon, may be more easily understood, some citation of the various opinions, existing among the ancient schools, concerning the augment and diminution of forms, will be of assistance. According to the testimony of (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Categories or Predicaments of Aristotle, Bk. III, chapter "On quality", three opinions already existed among the ancient philosophers concerning the extension of forms [intensio formarum] or concerning greater and lesser. « For some used to say, that in all (things) there can be discovered a more and less according to the habitude of matter. For "that it is proper to matter and bodies to grow by being extended [intensione] and to be diminished [minui] by being relaxed [relaxatione]", was the sentence of certain Platonists ». Which words of (St.) Boethius are thus expounded by Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), in tract. 8, ch. 1: « Indeed one (opinion) of those, who used to say, that in everything, in which a greater and lesser is found, matter is in some manner found, the quantity of which, as they say, consists out of indivisibles: where more similars convene in one, they say it is being extended [id intendi], and where there are fewer, they say it is being abated [illud remiti], and for that reason those are most white, in which concur more indivisibles of whiteness; but that (they) are being abated, where fewer convene. And

indeed this opinion, as (St.) Boethius says, was Plato’s.

[1] De hac solutione cfr. supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. Idem dicit Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 8. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2: « Quamvis forma non sit variabilis secundum suum esse absolutum, proprie loquendo de variabilitate, tamen quia naturalem habet aptitudinem, ut sit in materia, in qua potest recipere variabilitatem, simpliciter invariabilis dici non debet ».
[2] Ex aliquibus mss. ut I T supplevimus *augmentum*, pro quo Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 renitentibus, mox post *motus* ponit *augmenti*.
[3] In fundamentis, praecipue in ultimo et in corp. quaest. circa finem. — Paulo supra post *essentialis* cod. M habet *caritati*.
[4] Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 omittit *quod*. Mox in plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest *augementi*, certe tamen supplendum.
[5] Sequimur antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addendo *per accidens*.
[6] Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Qualitate, et IV. Phys. text. 79. seqq. (c. 9.) ac III. de Caelo text. 10, ubi definitio rarefactionis indicatur, scil, quod sit motus, quo corpus, manente eadem entitate et quantitate, maiorem acquirit localem extensionem. Quodsi rarefactio et protensio ad invicem conferuntur, secundum mentem S. Doctoris infra d. 18. dub. 4. dici potest, quod rarefactio sit processus naturalis, protensio vero processus artificialis; priori opponeretur condensatio, poteriori compressio.
[7] Vat. male omittit hic *est aliud et aliud*; paulo supra minus distincte ponit *non augetur* loco *mutatur*, deinde in fine responsionis *si dicit terminum per accidens* pro *sic dicit*, sed obstat auctoritas mss. et sex primarum edd. — Nota insuper, quod Vat. cum multis codd. praemissam propositionem. *Et per hoc patet* etc. contingit cum responsione ad tertiam obiectionem; sed non bene, quia revera pertinet cum sequenti responsione ad quartum obiectum. Pauci codd. ad connexionem harum responsionum stabiliendam post *non sic dicit* addunt *tamen potest aliter dici*.
[8] Unus alterque codex ut I Q *quod* loco *quia*.
[9] Contextu exigente, supplevimus *et sic est idem*, licet haec verba in paucis mss. ut H T et quidem in margine (a manu suppari) inveniantur. Mox fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 *Hinc est, quod* substituimus loco *Et hinc est, quia*.

[1] On this solution, cf. above d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, in reply to n. 1. Richard of Middleton says the same, Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, a. 2, q. 2, in reply to n. 2: « Although a form is not variable according to its own absolute ‘being’, speaking properly of variability, however, because it has a natural aptitude, to be in the matter, in which it can receive variability, it ought not to be said (to be) simply invariable ».
[2] From some manuscripts, such as I and T, we have supplied *an augment* [augmentum], in place of which the Vatican edition, together with codex cc, yet with the other codices and edition 1 striving against this, then puts *of increase* [augmenti] after *movement* [motus].
[3] In the fundamenta, chiefly in the last one, n. 5, and in the body of the question, near the end. — A little above this after *essential* [essentialis], codex M has *to charity* [caritati].
[4] The Vatican edition, contrary to nearly all the codices and edition 1 omits *that* [quod]. Next in very many manuscripts and edition 1 *of increase* [augmenti] is lacking, yet certainly to be supplied.
[5] We follow the more ancient codices and edition 1, by adding *per accidens*.
[6] Cf. Aristotle, On the Predicaments, the chapter “On Quality”, and Physics, Bk. IV, text 79 ff. (ch. 9), and On Heaven, Bk. III, text 10, where the definition of “rarefaction” is indicated, namely, that which is a movement, by which a body, remaining the same entity and quantity, acquires a greater local extension. Wherefore, supposing that rarefaction and pretension (“being stretched out”) refer to one another, it can be said according to the mind of the Seraphic Doctor, d. 18, dubium 4, that rarefaction is the natural process, but pretension the artificial process; to the former there would be opposed condensation, to the latter compression.
[7] The Vatican edition badly omits here *now one thing now another* [aliud et aliud]; a little above this, it puts less distinctly *is not increased* [non augetur] in place of *is changed* [mutatur], then at the end of the response *if it means a terminus per accidens* [si dicit terminum per accidens] for *(the Apostle does mean (it) in this manner* [sic dicit], but the authority of the manuscripts and of the six first editions withstands this. — Note above, that the Vatican edition, together with many codices, conjoins with the aforementioned proposition *And through this what is objected* etc. with the response to the third objection; but non well, because it truly pertains with the following response to the fourth objection. A few codices, to establish the connection of these responses (to n. 4), at the end of this first half, add *yet it can be said in another manner* [tamen potest alite dici].
[8] One or the other codex, such as I and Q, has *that* [quod] for *that* [quia].
[9] As required by the context, we have supplied *and thus it is the same* [et sic est idem], though these words are found in a few manuscripts, such as H and I and indeed in the margin (in nearly the same

hand). Next, trusting in very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *Hence it is, that* [Hinc est, quod] in place of *And hence it is, that* [Et hinc est, quia].

Pla- /- tonis. Videtur autem ab antiquo Anaxagora derivata, qui dixit, simile simili generari, et omnia esse in omnibus, sed latere: et ideo etiam intendi et remitti quodcumque secundum plus et minus apparet de ipso simili ». — « *Alia* vero, quae secundum certissimas verissimasque artes atque virtutes non diceret esse magis et minus, secundum autem medias dici posse, ut haec ipsa grammatica atque iustitia non dicitur magis grammatica neque magis iustitia. Esse autem quasdam alias mediocres artes, in quibus id ipsum posset evenire (sicut de dispositione fit habitus medius, ut B. Albetus adiungit). *Tertia* est, de qua Aristoteles loquitur, quod ipsas quidem habitudines nulla intensione crescere nec diminutione descrescere putat, sed eorum *participantes* (seu subiecta) posse sub examine compositionis venire, ut de his magis minusve dicatur. Santitatem namque ipsam et iustitiam alteram altera magis minusve non esse; neque enim quisquam dicit, magis esse sanitatem alia sanitate. Sed hoc solum dicere possumus, magis habere sanitatem aliquem, i. e. esse saniorem, et magis sanum et minus sanum. Dicimus ergo, quod *ipsae qualitates* non suscipiunt magis et minus; *qui vero secundum eas quales dicuntur*, ipsi sub comparatione cadunt, ut iustior et sanior et grammaticior ». — Gilbertus Porretanus (de Sex principiis, c. ult.), tres sententias hac de re affert, quae suo tempore a diversis defendebantur et triplici antiquorum opinioni correspondere videtur. « Aiunt enim quidam secundum crementum vel diminutionem eorum quae suscipiunt *subiectorum*. Aliter autem et alii *ipsa quidem quae suscipiuntur* in suscipiente diminui et crescere annuntiant. Alii autem secundum *utrumque* amborum diminutionem et augmentationem ». Pluribus rationibus contra triplicem hanc sententiam adductis, concludit: « Patet itaque nihil secundum magis et minus praedicari neque secundum subiecti solum

Moreover it seems derived from the ancient Anaxagoras, who said, that like generates like, and all is in all, but is lying hidden; and for that reason everything whatsoever appears to be extended and abated according to more and less of this like ». — « But *the other one*, which said that there is not a “more or less” according to the most certain and most true arts and virtues, but that there can be said to be (one) according to median (arts and virtues), as this very grammar and justice are not said (to be) more grammar and more justice. But that there are certain other mediocre arts, in which the very same could come about (just as a median habit comes to be from a disposition, as St. Albertus adds). *The third* one is, that of which Aristotle speaks, because he indeed thought that those habitudes do not increase [crescere] by any extension [intensione] nor decrease by diminution, but that those participating in (or subject to) them can come under an examination of (their) composition, such that of these a “more or less” is said. For no one says that health itself or justice are each now more or less than the other health or justice, nor that there is more health than another health. But we can say this alone, that someone has more health, i. e. is healthier, and that (something is) more healthful and less healthful. Therefore we say, that *qualities themselves* do not undertake a “more and a less”; *but those which are said (to be) such according to them*, fall under a comparison, such as “more just” and “more healthy” and “more grammatical” ». — Gilbert of Porretain (On the Six Principles, last chapter), mentions three sentences on this matter, which used to be defended by diverse (authors) in his own time and it seems that these correspond to the threefold opinion of the ancient (philosophers). « For certain (authors) say (that quantity is) according to the increment and/or diminution of their *subjects*, which take them up. But indeed in

augmentum vel diminutionem neque secundum accidentis; quare neque secundum utrumque. Oportet igitur ab alia ea invenire, quae cum magis et minus dicantur. Huiusmodi vero sunt ea, quae sunt in voce eorum quae adveniunt, et non secundum subiecti vel mobilis crementum vel diminutionem, sed quoniam eorum, quae sunt in voce, impositioni propinquiora sunt, sive ab eadem remotiora. De his etenim *cum magis* dicuntur quae proximiora sunt ei quae in ipsa voce est impositioni, *cum minus* autem de his quae remotiora consistunt, ut album dicitur illud, in quo pura albedo est, quanto igitur ad vocis impositionem accedens puriori inficitur albedine, tanto et candidor assignabitur . . . Dubitabit autem aliquis, quare haec quidem cum magis et minus dicantur, substantiae vero minime? Hoc autem contingit, quoniam substantiarum impositio quidem in termino est, ultra quem transgredi impossibile est. Additur autem et de accidentibus quibusdam, quae sine magis et minus dicuntur, ut quadrangulus et triangulus et similia, non enim triangulus magis unus altero dicitur ».

another manner others also announce that that those which are taken up in the one taking them up do diminish and increase. Moreover others (say that there is) a diminution and augmentation of both according *to each* ». Having adduced very many reasons against this threefold sentence, he concludes: « And so it is clear that nothing is predicated according to a “more and less”, neither according to the augment and/or diminution of the subject alone, nor according to (that) of the accident; nor by that by which (it is) according to each. Therefore one is bound to discover by some other means, what (things) are said with “a more and less”. But of this kind are those (things), which are in the expression of the affixed [quae sunt in voce eorum quae adveniunt], and not (because they are) according to an increase and/or diminution of the subject and/or of a movable, but since they are nearer to the imposition of those, which are in the expression [in voce], or more remote from the same. For indeed those which are nearer to that imposition which is in the expression itself are said *with (the word) “more”*, but *with (with the word) “less”* those which consist of those more remote, such as (something) white is said to be that, in which there is pure whiteness, therefore as much as an accident according to the imposition of the expression [vocis] is imbued with a purer whiteness, so much also shall “whiter” be assigned . . . But will anyone doubt, why these indeed are said with a “more and less”, but substances not at all? But this happens, since the imposition of substances indeed is in a terminus, beyond which it is impossible to transgress. But there is also an addition of certain accidents, which are said without a “more and less”, as quadrangular and triangular and the like, for one is not said (to be) more a triangle than the other ».

II. In solut. ad 1. tangitur quaestio inter Scholasticos in utramque partem disputata, utrum ipsae formae substantiales eiudem speciei, praesertim animae intellectuales, recipiant magis et minus, sive esse possint inaequalis perfectionis. Quod intelligendum est non de perfectione *specifica*, quae certa est eadem in individuis eiusdem *speciei*, sed de perfectione *individuali*, non de

II. The solution to n. 1 touches upon both sides of the question, disputed among the Scholastics, whether the very substantial forms of the same species, especially the intellectual ones of the soul, receive a “more or less”, or can be of an unequal perfection. Which is to be understood not of the *specific* perfection, which certainly is the same in individuals of the same species,

perfectione *accidentali*, quae certe diversa est in diveris, sed de *substantiali*, secundum gradum perfectionis consequentem naturam individui. Utraque sententia, i.e. affirmativa et negativa, est probabilis. Fautores sententiae, quod sint inaequales, pro se citatnt decretum aliquod doctorum Parisiensium, ab Henrico Gandav. (Quod. 3. q. 5.) et Durando (II. Sent. d. 32. q. 3.) relatum: « Si quis dicat, omnes animas ab origine esse aequales, errat, quoniam alias anima Christi non esset perfectior anima Iudae ». Durand. hoc decretum ad perfectionem potentiarum sensitivarum et vegetivarum restringere conatur, licet parum probabiliter; alii id non habere irrefragabilem auctoriatem dicunt. De sententia S. Thom. disputatur, licet Caienta. (ad S. I. q. 85. a. 7.) dicat, caecos esse, qui dubitent, ipsum stare pro inaequalitate. Scotus autem cum aliis pluribus ex talibus caecis unum se esse profitetur. Interpretationi Caietani favent multa testimonia S. Thom., ut S. I. q. 50. a. 4. q. 85. a. 7; II. Sent. d. 32. a. 3; I. Sent. d. 8. q. 5. a. 2. ad 6. — Sententiae neganti partitatem perfectionis adhaeret etiam S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. dub. 2, et d. 32. dub. 6. — Sententia autem Scoti dubia est, licet magis favere videtur huic ultimae sententiae, ut patet ex eius testimoniis colectis in Summ. Hieronymi a Montefortino t. II. p. 1. q. 85. a. 7. incident.

but of *individual* perfection, not of *accidental* perfection, which certainly is diverse in diverse (individuals), but of *substantial* (perfection), according to the grade of perfection consequent to the nature of the individual. Each sentence, i.e. the affirmative and negative, is probable. The supporters of the sentence, that they are unequal, cite for their part that decree of the doctors of Paris, reported by Henry of Ghent (Quodlibetals, 3, q. 5) and by Durandus (Sent., Bk. II, d. 32, q. 3): « If anyone says, that all souls are by (their) origin [ab origine] equal, he errs, since otherwise the soul of Christ would not be more perfect than the soul of Judas (Iscariot) ». Durandus strives to restrict this decree to the perfection of the sensitive and vegetive powers, though equally probably, some say that it does not have an irrefragable authority. On the sentence of St. Thomas there is a dispute, though Cajetan (on Summa., I, q. 85, a. 7) says, that they are blind, who doubt, that he stands for (their) inequality. But (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, together with very many others, professes that he is one of those blind men. Many testimonies of St. Thomas favor the interpretation of Cajetan, such as Summa., I, q. 50, a. 4, q. 85, a. 7; Sent., Bk. II, d. 32, a. 3; Bk. I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2 in reply to n. 6. — Even St. Bonaventure adheres to the sentence denying (their) parity of perfection, in Sent., Bk II, d. 3, p. I, dubium 2, and d. 32, dubium 6. — But the sentence of (Bl. John Duns) Scotus is doubtful, though it seems to more favor this last sentence, as is clear from the testimonies collected from his writings by Jerome of Montefortino, in the Summa., Bk. II, p. I, q. 85, a. 7.

In solut. ad 3. duplex datur responsio. *Prima* est: etiamsi concedatur, quod in rebus *corporalibus* augmentum sit solummodo secundum accidens non secundum substantiam, tamen hoc non valet in augmento *virtutum*. *Secunda* vero responsio negat, quod motus augmenti in corporalibus sit tantum secundum accidens, quod est quantitas, quin addatur ipsi substantiae. Ad hoc probandum distinguitur duplex terminus augmenti: *formalis* sive per se, et hic est ipsa quantitas, et *accidentalis*, et hic est ipsa substantia.

In the solution to n. 3. a twofold response is given. The *first* is: even if it one concedes, that in corporal things there is an augment only according to accident and not according to substance, yet this is not valid in the augment for *virtues*. The *second* response, however, denies, that a movement of increase is in corporals only according to the accident, which is quantity, but that it is added to the substance itself. To prove this there is distinguished a twofold terminus of the increase: *the formal* or per se, and this is the quantity itself, and

the accidental, and this is the substance itself.

III. Alex. Hal. S. p. IV. q. 9. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. — Scot., de hac. et seq. hic q. 4. et seqq.; Report., hic q. 3. et seqq. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 24. a. 4. — B. Albert., de hac et duabus seqq. hic a. 10. et III. Sent. d.29. a. 10; et IV. Sent. d. 7. a. 5. quaestiunc. 3; S. I. p.II. tr. 16. q. 101. m. 2, et q. 102. m. 1. — Guilielmus Paris, de Virtut. a. 2. q.1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodlib. 5. q. 19. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 4.

III. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. IV, q. 9, m. 3, a. 2, § 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, on this and the following question, here in q. 4. and the ff.; Reportatio, here in q. 3. et ff.. — St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 1; Summa., II II, q. 24, a. 4. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), on this and the following two questions, here in a. 10, and Sent., Bk. III, d.29, a. 10; and Bk. IV, d. 7, a. 5, quaestiuncula 3; Summa., I, p. II, tr. 16, q. 101, m. 2, and q. 102, m. 1. — William of Paris , On Virtues, a. 2, q.1. — Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals. 5, q. 19. — Durandus, here in q. 5. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 6. — Biel, here in q. 4.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII.

PARS II.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 310-313.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVII

PART II

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 310-313.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO II.	QUESTION 2
Quomodo caritas augeatur.	*In what manner charity is increased.*
Secundo quaritur de modo augmenti ipsius caritatis. Et quod augmentum eius sit aliunde, ostenditur:	**Second there is asked** concerning the manner of the augment itself of charity. And that its augment is from elsewhere, is shown:
1. Per Augustinum,[1] qui dicit, quod « caritas meretur augeri »; sed quod aliquis meretur habet ab alio quam a se: ergo si caritas meretur augmentum, habet ipsum aliunde.	1. Through (St.) Augustine,[1] who says, that « charity merits to be increased »; but what anyone merits, he has from an other than himself: therefore if charity merits an augment, it has it from elsewhere.
2. Item, quod augmentetur per appositionem, videtur per *rationem* augmenti:[2] « augmentum enim est praeexistentis quantitatis additamentum »: ergo . . .	2. Likewise, that (charity) is augmented through apposition, seems through *the reckoning* of an augment: « for an augment is the addition [additamentum] of a pre-existing quantity »: therefore . . .

[1] Epist. ad Bonifacium. Cfr. q. praeced. fundam. 1.
[2] Fide plurium mss. ut F G H I O ff adiecimus *augmenti*, loco cuius in multis mss. et sex primis edd. falso habetur *Augustini*. Ratio seu definitio allegata invenitur in Aristot., I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 31. (c. 5): Augmentatio enim est existentis magnitudinis additamentum.

[1] Epistle to Boniface. Cf. the preceding question, fundament n. 1.
[2] Trusting in very many manuscripts, such as F G H I O and ff, we have inserted *of an augment* [augmenti], in place of which, in many manuscripts and in the six first editions, there is had *of (St.) Augustine*. The reason or definition cited is found in Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 31 (ch. 5): For an augmentation is the addition of an existing magnitude.

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ubi est augmentum, ibi est appositio alicuius eiusdem generis, et ubi appositio, ibi additio: ergo etc.	where there is an augment, there is an apposition of something of the same genus, and where an apposition, there an addition [additio]
3. Item, hoc videtur posse ostendi per *simile*, quia[1] caritas est in anima, sicut lux in aëre; sed lux in aëre augetur per additionem novi luminis, ut patet, si uni candelae illuminanti supervenit alia: ergo et in caritate erit similiter respectu animae.	3. Likewise, this seems able to be shown through *a simile*, because[1] charity is in the soul, as light (is) in the air; but light in the air is increased through the addition of a new light, as is clear, if one illuminating candle overcomes another: therefore also in charity will there be (an augment) in a similar manner in respect to the soul.
4. Item, hoc videtur per *principium* augmenti, quia ex eisdem est unumquodque et nutritur et augetur:[2] ergo per consimilem modum habet caritas generari, conservari et augeri; sed generatur in nobis per divinam influentiam: ergo et per eandem maiorem augetur; sed ubi maior influentia, aliquid plus influit[3] quam prius; et ubi hoc, ibi est additio: ergo etc.	4. Likewise, this seems through the *principle* of the augment; because every single thing [unumquodque] is both nourished and increased out of the same (things):[2] therefore through a completely similar manner charity has a "to be generated", a "to be conserved" and a "to be increased"; but it is generated in us through a divine influence: therefore also through a greater same is it increased; but where (there is) a greater influence, something inflows[3] more

than before; and where this (is the case), there is an addition: ergo etc..

CONTRA: 1. Maioris virtutis est calor amoris spiritualis quam ignis materialis; sed ignis se ipso augetur:[4] ergo et caritas, quae est ignis spiritualis.

2. Item, quod non per appositionem, videtur, quia si simplex simplici addatur, nihil maius efficitur, nec mole nec virtute, ut si punctus puncto:[5] ergo nec si caritas addatur caritati, erit maior.

3. Item, si additur aliquid, cum additionem sequatur compositio, et ad maiorem compositionem virtutis diminutio:[6] ergo quanto maior fit additio, tanto efficitur caritas impotentior, et quanto impotentior, tanto minor: ergo cum augmentum caritatis sit quantum ad virtutem, caritas non augetur per additionem.

4. Item, si aliquid addatur priori caritati, aut additum est caritas, aut non, si non: ergo non auget caritatem; si vero est caritas; sed caritas non est materialis respectu caritatis: ergo cum ex aliquibus duobus non fiat unum, nisi unum sit materiale respectu alterius,[7] ex caritate praeexistente et superaddita non fit unum; sed ad augmentum necesse est fieri unum ex augente et aucto: ergo nullo modo per additionem augetur.[8]

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The warmth of spiritual love [amoris] is of greater virtue than (the warmth) of material fire; but fire is increased by itself:[4] therefore also charity, which is a spiritual fire.

2. Likewise, it seems, that (charity is) not (increased) through apposition, because if the simple is added to the simple, it becomes nothing greater, neither in mass nor in virtue, (just) as if a point (is added) to a point:[5] therefore neither if charity is added to charity, will it be greater.

3. Likewise, if something is added, when a composition follows the addition, (there is) also (added) to the greater composition a diminution of virtue:[6] therefore as much as a greater addition is made, so much does charity become more impotent, and as much as more impotent, so much the lesser: therefore since the augment of charity is as much as regards virtue, charity is not increased through addition.

4. Likewise, if anything is added to a prior charity, either charity is added, or not, if not: therefore charity is not increased; but if it is, charity (is); but charity is not material in respect to charity: therefore since from two somethings there does not come to be one, unless one is material in respect to the other,[7] out of a pre-existent and superadded charity there does not come to be one (thing); but for an augment it is necessary that one (thing) come to be out of the one increasing and the one increased: therefore in no manner is it increased[8] through addition.

CONCLUSIO.

Caritas augetur virtute divina per appositionem vel incrementum maioris influentiae.

CONCLUSION

Charity is increased by divine virtue through the apposition and/or increase of a greater influence.

RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam[9] notandum, quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. Una est, quod augmentum caritatis est per depurationem sive per impermixtionem cum contrario. Contrarium autem amoris casti[10] est amor concupiscentiae; unde quanto magis in nobis extinguitur concupiscentia, tanto magis depuratur caritas; et quanto magis depuratur, tanto magis assimiliatur Deo et

I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must[9] be noted, that there was about this a twofold opinion. One is, that an augment of charity is through a purification from [depurationem] or through a thorough unmingling with (their) contrary [impermixtionem cum contrario]. But the contrary of chaste love [amoris casti][10] is the love of concupiscence; whence as much as concupiscence is more extinguished in

accedit ad terminum; et quano magis accedit, tanto magis augetur. Et isti posuerunt, caritatem posse per se augeri per assuefactionem in bono et debilitationem concupiscentiae. Ratio autem, quae istos movit, fuit auctoritas Philosophi,[11] qui dicit, formas intendi per accessum ad terminum et impermixtionem cum contrario. Fuit etiam cum hoc auctoritas Augustini, qui dicit in libro octoginta trium Quaestionum,[12] quod sicut minuitur concupiscentia, sic crescit caritas; et tale augmentum per maiorem depurationem simplici non repugnat.

us, so much more is charity purified [depuratur]; and as much as it is more purified, so much more is it assimilated to God and does it approach (its) terminus; and as much as it more approaches, so much more is it increased. And they (who held this) posited, that charity can through itself be increased through being-accustomed to [assuefactionem in] the good and (through) the debilitation of concupiscence. Moreover, the reason, which moved them, was the authority of the Philosopher,[11] who says, that forms are extended [intendi] through an approach to (their) terminus and (through) a thorough unmingling with (their) contrary. Together with him was the authority of (St.) Augustine, who says in The Book of 83 Questions,[12] that just as concupiscence is lessened, so charity increased; and such an augment through a greater purification [depurationem] is not repugnant to (something) simple.

Sed ista positio non est conveniens, quoniam[13] constans est, caritatem maiorem et minorem esse, omni sublata concupiscentia, sicut in primo homine et etiam in Angelis; ergo cum omnino sit ibi impermixta, in quolibet Angelo et etiam in statu innocentiae esset in summo, quod stultum est dicere. Unde non est dicendum, quantum ad remissionem concupiscentiae augeri[14] secundum *substantiam*, concedendum est tamen, quantum ad remissionem concupiscentiae *intendi per fervorem*. Et hoc modo intelligit Augustinus; et hoc modo loquitur etiam Philosophus de formis quantum ad intensionem, non quantum ad augmentum.

But that position of theirs is not fitting, since[13] it is an established (opinion), that charity is greater and lesser, with every concupiscence borne away, just as in the First Man and even in the Angels; therefore since it is thoroughly unmingled there, in any Angel and even in the state of innocence it would be in the highest degree [in summo], which is a foolish thing to say. Whence it must not be said, that as much as regards the remission of concupiscence (charity) [14] is increased according to (its) *substance*, yet it must be conceded, that as much as regards the remission of concupiscence *it is extended through fervor*. And in this manner (St.) Augustine understands (it); and in this manner even the Philosopher speaks of forms as much as regards (their) extension [intensionem], not as much as regards (their) augment.

Alia positio est, quod caritas augetur per appo- / -sitionem; . . .

The other position is, that charity is increased through appo- / -sition; . . .

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1 Vat. minus distincte et contra plurimos mss. *quod* loco *quia*, et mox perperam et contra codd. ac ed. 1 *non augetur* pro *augetur*, et *illuminatae* loco *illuminanti*.
2 Aristot., II. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 50. (c. 8.): Omnia enim nutriuntur ex eisdem, et quibus sunt. In illa propositione Vat. perperam et contra mss. ac ed. 1 omittit *est*.
3 Cod. O usitatiore modo *influitur*.

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1 The Vatican edition less distinctly, and contrary to very many manuscripts, reads *that/because* [quod] for *because* [quia], and next faultily and contrary to the codices and edition 1, it has *is not increased* [non augetur] for *is increased* [augetur], and *illuminated* [illuminatae] for *illuminating* [illuminanti].
2 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. II, text 50 (ch. 8): For all (things) are nourished out of the same, by which they also are. In that proposition the

[4] Cfr. Aristot., I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 39. (c. 5): Nam ignem ad hunc facere modum contingit, videlicet iniectis in eum qui iam est lignis. Verum ita quidem accretio (augmentatio) est; at cum ligna ipsa accenduntur, generatio (ed. Firmin-Didot.).

[5] Est Aristotelis, I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 8. (c. 2.), ubi ostendit, quod puncta addita punctis non faciant magnitudinem sive neque maius neque minus. — Mox cod. T *est* loco *erit*.

[6] Auctor libr. de Causis, propos. 17: Omnis vis unita plus est infinita, quam virtus multiplicata. Cfr. etiam Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5.

[7] Vide Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.): Imposibile enim est, substantiam ex substantiis esse, quae sic insunt ut actu; quae enim duo sic actu sunt, nunquam unum actu sunt; sed si potentia duo sunt, erunt unum, ut duplum ex duobus dimidiis potentia; actus namque separat.

[8] Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *potest augeri*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A G H R T U Y Z ee ff cum ed. 1 *augmentato*, aliqui autem perperam *augmento* pro *aucto*.

[9] Aliqui codd. ut T X addunt *est*.

[10] Vat. cum cod. cc *Christi* pro *casti*, sed obstat auctoritas antiquiorum codd. cum ed. 1 et contextus nec non usus loquendi S. Doctoris, de quo vide supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 1. in fine corp. quaest.

[11] Libr. V. Phys. text. 19. (c. 2): Magis autem et minus est ex eo, quia plus aut minus contrarii inest, et non. Et III. Top. c. 4 circa medium (c. 5): Et quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora, magis talia; ut alibius quidem nigro impermixtius.

[12] Quaest. 36: Nutrimentum eius (caritatis) est imminutio cupiditatis: perfectio, nulla cupiditas. — Et paulo post: Quisquis igitur eam nutrire vult, instet minuendis cupiditatibus. Cfr. etiam Enchirid. c. 121 n. 32, ubi dicit: Minuitur autem cupiditas, caritate crescente.

[13] Plurimis mss. cum ed. 1 postulantibus, posuimus *quoniam* loco *quia*.

[14] Supple cum cod. Y *caritatem*.

Vatican edition faultily, and contrary to the manuscripts and to edition 1, omits *is* [est].

[3] Codex O in the more usual manner has *is influenced* [influitur].

[4] Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 39 (ch. 5): For one happens to cause fire according to this manner, that is, with logs thrown into that which already is (fire). Truly thus indeed is there an accretion (augmentation); but when the logs themselves are lighted, a generation (edition of Firmin-Didot).

[5] This is the teaching of Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 8 (ch. 2), where he shows, that points added to points do not make a magnitude or neither "a more" nor "a less". — Next codex T has *is it* [est] place of *will it be* [erit].

[6] The author of The Book of Causes, proposition 17: Every united force is more infinite, than a multiplied virtue. Cf. also (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 5.

[7] See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 49 (Bk. VI, ch. 13): For it is impossible, that a substance be out of substances, which are also in act in the same manner; for two which are in act in the same manner, are never one in act; but if there are two potencies, there will be one (thing), as a double out of the potency of two halves; for an act separates.

[8] The Vatican edition, contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1, has *can it be increased* [potest augeri]. A little before this very many codices, such as A G H R T U Y Z ee and ff, together with edition 1, have *the one augmented* [augmentato], but others faultily *the augment* [augmento], for *the one increased* [aucto].

[9] Some codices, such as T and X, add explicitly *it must* [est].

[10] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has *of Christ's love* [amor Christi], but the authority of the more ancient codices together with edition 1, and the context and the manner of speech of the Seraphic Doctor withstand this, concerning which see above d. 1, a. 2, q. 1, at the end of the body of the question.

[11] Physics, Bk. V, text 19, (ch. 2): But a "more and less" is out of this, that more or less of the contrary is in it, and not. And Topics, Bk. III, ch. 4, near the middle (ch. 5): And those which are thoroughly unmingled with contraries, (are) more such; as indeed (something) more white (is) more thoroughly unmingled with black.

[12] Question 36: Its (i.e. charity's) nourishment is the lessening of cupidity: (its) perfection, no cupidity. — And a little before this: Therefore anyone wanting to nourish it (i.e. charity), let him insist on diminishing cupidities. Cf. also Enchiridion., ch. 121, n. 32, where (St. Augustine) says: But cupidity diminishes, with charity increasing.

[13] As required by very many manuscripts, together with edition 1, we have put *since* [quoniam] in place of *because* [quia].

[14] Supply together with codex Y *charity* [caritatem].

appo- / -sitionem; et huius simile habetur in lumine, quod expresse caritati assimilatur.[1] Unde sicut maius lumen, additum minori, ipsum auget, sic caritas superaddita auget minorem. Et haec positio ponit, caritatem non augeri virtute propria, sed divina. Idem enim est principium augendi et generandi.[2] Unde sicut a solo Deo habet ortum, ita et augmentum.

appo- / -sition; and (something) similar to this is had in a light, which is expressly likened to [assimilatur] charity.[1] Whence just as a greater light, added to a lesser one, increases it, so a superadded charity increases a lesser one. And this position posits, that charity is not increased by its own virtue, but by a divine one. For the same is the principle of being increased and of being generated.[2] Whence just as it has it rise from God alone, so as (its) augment.

1. Ex hoc patet illud quod obiicitur per simile in igne. Ignis enim habet potestatem faciendi se in alio et augendi, non sic caritas.

1. From this is clear that which is objected through (what is) similar in fire. For fire has the power to cause itself (to be) in another and to be increased, not so charity.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod caritas est simplex;[3] dicendum, quod quamvis caritas sit simplex, quia non habet partes quantitativas quantitate *molis*, habet tamen quantitate *virtutis*, et quantum ad illam[4] potest augeri. Si obiiciatur de puncto, quod habet quantitatem virtutis et tamen non augetur; dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid sit natum augeri per appositionem consimilis quantitatis, duo sunt necessaria, scilicet quantitas et unibilitas. Unibilitas autem venit ex imperfectione, perfecto enim in quantum huiusmodi non est possibilis additio:[5] et ideo puncto non potest fieri additio. Licet igitur punctus habeat quantitatem virtutis, non tamen habet unibilitatem, quia quoddam perfectum est in suo genere.

2. To that which is objected second, that charity is simple;[3] it must be said, that although charity is simple, because it does not have parts quantitative according to a quantity of *mass*, yet it does have (them) according to a quantity of *virtue*, and as much as regards that[4] it can be increased. If it is objected concerning the point, that it has a quantity of virtue, and yet it is not increased; it must be said, that for this, that something be bound to be increased through an apposition of a completely similar quantity, two (things) are necessary, namely a quantity and a unibility (i. e. an ability to be united). But unibility comes out of an imperfection, for to the perfect, inasmuch as (it is) of this kind, an addition is not possible:[5] and for that reason an addition cannot be made to a point. Therefore, though a point does have a quantity of virtue, it does not have unibility, because it is a certain perfect something [quoddam perfectum] in its genus.

Aliter potest dici, quod punctus est simplicissimum in genere *quanti molis*,[6] et ideo est infinitum virtute; caritas autem nulla est simplicissima in genere *quanti virtualis* nisi divina, et ideo illa est infinita; et quoniam illa non potest augeri per additionem, ita nec virtus puncti. *Et si obiicias* mihi, quod virtus puncti est creata, ergo non est infinita; dicendum, quod quia punctus est[7] simplicissimum *in genere*, non *simpliciter*, ideo non habet infinitam virtutem *simpliciter*, sed *in genere respectu* linearum. *Praeterea*, punctus non est omnino actus, sed terminus respectu linearum; ideo non habet potentiam activam infinitam, sed passivam, quia non proprie

In another manner it can be said, that a point is the most simple (thing) in the genus of *the quantum of mass* [quanti molis],[6] and for that reason it is infinite in virtue; but no charity is most simple in the genus of the *quantum of virtue* [quanti virtualis], unless (it be) divine (Charity), and for that reason That is infinite; and since That cannot be increased through addition, thus neither the virtue of a point. *And if you object to me*, that the virtue of a point is created, therefore it is not infinite; it must be said, that, because a point is the most simple (thing)[7] *in (its) genus*, not *simply* (speaking), for that reason it does not have infinite virtue *simply*, but *in (its) genus in respect to*

dicitur punctus posse lineas producere, sed potest statui terminus lineae; et hoc non est inconveniens ponere in creatura: ideo virtus puncti non est augmentabilis, ut virtus caritatis.

Besides, a point is not entirely an act, but a terminus in respect to lines, for that reason it does not have an active, infinite power, but a passive one, because a point is not properly said to be able to produce lines, but can be the terminus for the standing still [statui] of a line; and it is not unfitting to posit this in the creature: for that reason the virtue of a point is not augmentable, as the virtue of charity (is).

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto aliquid est magis compositum, tanto est impotentius;[8] dicendum; quod illud generaliter intellectum, est falsum. Propter hoc distinguendum, quod sunt partes materialies, et sunt partes formales, quae dant actum et virtutem toti. *Simplex* igitur *magis* potest dici per *privationem* partium *materialium*; et tunc habet propositio veritatem, quia tales partes potius dant pati quam agere, unde quanto aliquid magis elongatur a materia, tanto potentius. Si autem dicatur *magis simplex*, quia pauciores habet partes *formales* sive activas, falsum est, quia tunc ignis minoris potentior esset quam maior. Tunc etiam[9] sirupus, compositus ex paucis, virtuosior esset quam ille qua constat ex multis; quorum utrumque falsum est: et ideo et praedicta propositio,[10] quoniam tam caritas praeexistens quam adveniens, utraque habet rationem activi.

3. To that which is objected, that as much as something is more composite, so much is it more impotent;[8] it must be said, that generally understood it is false. On this account one must distinguish, that there are material parts, and there are formal parts, which give act and virtue to the whole. Therefore "*simple*" can be said *more* through *the privation of material* parts; and then the proposition has truth, because such parts give a "to suffer" rather than a "to act", whence as much as something is made more distant [magis elongatur] from matter, so much (is it) more potent. But if it *rather*, said (to be) *simple*, because it has fewer *formal* or active parts, it is false, because then a lesser fire would be more potent than a greater one. Then even[9] syrup [sirupus], composed from a few (things), would be more virtuous than that which consists of many; each of which is false; and for that reason also the proposed proposition,[10] since as much as charity (is) pre-existent as (it is) added [adveniens], each (charity) has the reckoning of (something) active.

Potest tamen aliter responderi secundum veritatem, quod caritas augmentata non est magis composita, immo magis simplex; et hoc patet sic: quia contrario modo est in quanto *molis* et[11] quanto *virtutis*. In quanto *molis* simplicissimum est minimum, ut punctus; et ideo in hoc genere quanti accessus ad simplicitatem est per diminutionem, recessus[12] e contrario per additionem. In quanto vero *virtutis* simplicissimum est maximum; et ideo accessus ad simplicitatem est per additionem; et hinc est, quod caritas augmentata est purior et simplicior et Deo similior. Nec videatur[13] hoc inconveniens, quia addere puritatem et simplicitatem et spiritualitatem alicui non facit recessum a simplicitate, sed magis accessum.

However, in another manner (the objection) can be responded to according to the truth, that augmented charity is not more composite, nay more simple, and this is clear in this manner: because in a contrary manner it is in a quantum *of mass* and[11] a quantum *of virtue*. In a quantum of *mass* the most simple is the least one, such as the point, and for that reason in this genus of quantum an approach [accessus] to simplicity is through diminution, a recess[12] contrariwise through addition. But in the quantum *of virtue* the most simple is the greatest; and for that reason an approach to simplicity is through an addition, and hence it is, that augmented charity is more pure and more simple and more similar to God. And this may not seem[13] unfitting, because

to add purity and simplicity and spirituality to anything does not cause a recess from simplicity, but rather an approach.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum ex eis[14] fiat unum; dicunt quidam, quod — sicut diversa lumina sunt in aëre distincta et inconfusa, attamen unum maius lumen reddunt propter concursum in unum susceptibile, sic in lumine spirituali, quod est gratia vel caritas — quod[15] distincta sunt essentialiter ta - / -men

4. To that which is objected, whether out of them[14] there comes to be one (thing); some say, that — just as diverse lights are in the air distinct and unconfused, but, however, render one greater light on account of (their) concourse in one susceptible (medium), so in the spiritual light, which is grace and/or charity — because[15] they are essentially distinct, yet . . .

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[1] August., Epist. 140. sue libr. de Gratia Novi Testam. c. 22. n. 54: Qualis enim lux est ipsa caritas, quis verbis explicet? . . . An forte lux non est caritas? Audi Apostolum Ioanem, ipse quippe dixit quod modo commemoravi: Quoniam Deus lux est . . . Deus caritas est. Ac per hoc, si Deus lux est, et Deus caritas est, profecto caritas lux ipsa est, quae diffunditur in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum etc.

[2] Vide supra fundam. 4. Cfr. etiam Aristot., II. de Anima text. 34-50. (c. 4.).

[3] Vat. omittit prater fidem mss. et ed. 1 indebite verba *caritas est simplex; dicendum, quod quamvis*.

[4] Scil. quantitatem virtutis, pro quo plures codd. ut A C L O P Q R S T Y bb cum ed. 1 minus apte hic addunt *partem*, sicut et aliqui codd. ut A C R S mox minus bene omittunt *potest*; codd. L O *augetur* loco *potest augeri*, cod. Y *augeri dicitur*.

[5] Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21, et X. text. 13. (IV. c. 16. et IX. c. 4.), ac II. de Caelo text. 23. (c. 4.), ubi perfectum definitur id, extra quod nihil eorum quae ipsius sunt, possibile est accipere. — Paulo ante ed. 1 cum uno alteroque cod. ut I *perfectioni* pro *perfecto*.

[6] Nonnulli codd. ut B V X Z aa bb *quantitatis molis*. Mox post *virtute* in cod. O explicative additur *quanti* et in cod. Z *in genere quanti*. Paulo infra aliqui codd. ut B X *quantitatis virtutis* loco *quanti virtualis*.

[7] Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. adiungit *quid*. Mox in pluribus codd. ut A H I S T X Y Z bb ee ff et edd. 1, 2, 3 minus bene deest adiectivum *infinitam*. Paulo infra post *sed in genere* in cod. B bene additur *scilicet*.

[8] In pluribus codd. ut S cc deest *quanto est* et dein *tanto*; et in ed. 1 omittuntur primum *est* et *tanto*.

[9] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *Tunc etiam*.

[10] Ita codd. cum ed. 1; Vat. *et ideo praedicta propositio est similiter falsa*.

[11] In cod. T hic repetitur *in*.

[12] Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum *est*.

[13] Aliqui codd. ut V Y cum ed. 1 *videtur*.

[14] Cod. T *his*.

[15] Supple: lumina spiritualia, scil. gratia gratiae addita. — Vat. praemittit *dicendum* contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1. Mox pauci codd. ut V X *efficitur* loco *efficiunt*.

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[1] (St.) Augustine, Epistle 140, or the book On the Grace of the New Testament, ch. 22, n. 54: For what kind of light charity itself is, who can anyone explain with words? . . . Or perhaps charity is not light? Hear the Apostle John, indeed he himself said that which I now remember: *Since God is light . . . God is charity*. And through this, if God is light, and God is charity, in a word charity is the light itself, which is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit etc..

[2] See above in fundament 4. Cf. also Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, texts 34-50 (ch. 4).

[3] The Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, omits unduly the words *charity is simple; it must be said, that although* [caritas est simplex; dicendum, quod quamvis].

[4] That is, "the quantity of virtue", in place of which very many codices, such as A C L O P Q R S T Y bb, together with edition 1, here aptly read *that part* [illam partem], just as even the other codices, such as A C R and S, next less well omit *can* [potest]; codices L and O read *is increased* [augetur] for *can be increased* [potest augeri], codex Y has *is said to be increased* [augeri dicitur].

[5] Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 21, and Bk. X, text 13 (Bk. IV, ch. 16, and Bk. IX, ch. 4), and On Heaven, Bk. II, text 23 (ch. 4), where the perfect is defined as that, outside of which it is possible to accept nothing of those, which belong to it. — A little before this edition 1, together with one or the other codex, such as I, has *to perfection* [imperfectioni] for *to the perfect* [perfecto].

[6] Not a few codices, such as B V X Z aa and bb have *of the quantity o mass* [quantitatis molis]. Next after *in virtue* [virtute] in codex O there is explicitly added *of the quantum* [quantum] and in codex A *in the genus of the quantum* [in genere quanti]. A little below this some codices, such as B and X have *of the quantity of virtue* [quantitatis virtutis] in place of *of the quantum of virtue* [quanti virtualis].

[7] The Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and to the six first editions, reads *something most simple* [quid simplicissimum] for *the most simple (thing)* [simplicissimum]. Next in very many codices, such as A H I S T X Y Z bb ee and ff and editions 1, 2, and 3, there is lacking, less well, the adjective *infinite* [infinitam]. A little below this after *but in (its) genus* [sed in genere], in codex B there is well added *that is* [scilicet].

8 In very many codices, such as S and cc, there is lacking *as much as is* [qanto est] and then *so much is* [tanto est]; and in edition 1, the first *is* [est] and the *so much* [tanto] are omitted.
9 From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied *Then even* [Tunc etiam].
10 Thus the codices, together with edition 1; the Vatican edition reads *and for that reason the aforesaid proposition is similarly false* [et ideo praedicta proposition est similiter falsa].
11
12 Trusting in very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged the there added *is* [est].
13 Some codices, such as V and Y, together with edition 1 have *does this seem* [videtur hoc].
14 Codex T reads *these* [his].
15 Supply: spiritual lights, that is grace added to grace. — The Vatican edition reads *it must be said that* [dicendum quod] for *because* [quod], contrary to very many codices and to edition 1. Next a few codices, such as V and X have [on the following page] *it is made* [efficitur] for *they become* [efficiunt].

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ta- /-men unum maius efficiunt in movendo virtutem liberi arbitrii.

they become one (thing) greater in moving the virtue of the free will [liberi arbitrii].

Sed tamen illud non est simile, quia distinctio luminarium in aëre venit a parte originum diversarum, ut puta quando plura sunt lucentia; non sic est in gratia. Et ideo dicendum, quod ex eis[1] fit unum.

But yet that (example) is not similar, because the distinction of lights in the air comes on the part of (their) diverse origins, as for example when there are many sources of light [lucentia]; not so is it in grace. And for this reason it must be said, that out of them[1] there does come to be one (thing).

Quod quaeritur,[2] quod se habet in ratione materialis; dicendum, quod augmentum contingit dupliciter fieri: aut per virtutem *ipsius augmentabilis*, ut patet in animali; et tunc augmentabile habet se in ratione formalis et activi, augmentans in ratione materialis et passivi. Contingit et[3] augmentum fieri per *virtutem extrinsecam*, possibilitate sola et unibilitate existente in augmentabili; et tunc augmentabile, quia imperfectum, se habet in ratione passivi,[4] augmentans, quia perficiens, in ratione formalis et completivi, quia dat quantitatem perfectam.

Because it is asked,[2] on which account [quod] does it hold itself in the reckoning of the material; it must be said, that an augment happens to come to be in a twofold manner: either through the virtue of the *augmentable itself*, as is clear in a living thing [in animali]; and then the augmentable holds itself in the reckoning of the formal and active, the augmenting in the reckoning of the material and passive. It also happens[3] that an augment comes to be through *extrinsic virtue*, solely by the possibility and unibility existing in the augmentable; and then the augmentable, because imperfect, holds itself in the reckoning of the passive,[4] the augmenting, because perfect, in the reckoning of the formal and completive, because it gives a perfect quantity.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod unum non est in

Because, therefore, it is objected, that the

potentia ad aliud; dicendum, quod non est in potentia ad conversionem, sed est in potentia ad unionem; et potentia ista est in caritate ratione suae imperfectionis; quia enim imperfecta est, ideo possibilis perfici et ideo unibilis rei perficienti. Unde non habet possibilitatem ad illud quod additur in quantum caritas, sed in quantum imperfecta; et sic patet illud.

one is not in potency to the other; it must be said, that it is not in potency for conversion, but it is in potency for union; and that potency is in charity by reason of its imperfection; for because it is imperfect, for that reason (it is) possible that it be perfected and for that reason it is unitable to the perfecting thing. Wherefore it does not have a possibility regarding that which is added inasmuch as (it is) charity, but inasmuch as (it is) imperfect; and thus that (objection) is clear.

SCHOLION.

I. Circa quaestionem de modo *speciali*, quo caritas augeatur, observamus, quod praeter duas opiniones in textu positas S. Thom., (S. II. II. q. 24. a. 5; I. Sent. d. 17. a. 2. a. 2.) defendit tertiam sententiam, scil. caritatem augeri non per additionem, sed per maiorem radicationem in subiecto, cui consentiunt Durand. (hic q. 6. 7.) et Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 6.). — S. Bonav. suam sententiam magis explicat II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2., ubi praeter tres improbabiles modos tres alios probabiles affert et sapienter concludit: « Quocumque horum modorum trium sequentium dicatur, non est magna vis facienda, sed pro certo habentes, gratiam Dei in nobis augeri posse, laborare debemus taliter, ut in nobis augeatur per bona opea ». Sententiam, cui Seraphicus plus favet, defendunt etiam Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Henr. Gand. et prae ceteris Scot. et posteriorum doctorum plurimi. Videsis de hac controversia Rada, Contr. 18., et Franc. Macedo, Collationes, coll. 7. different. 3. Hic sufficiat dicere, S. Bonav. *additionem novorum graduum* minime intelligere in eo sensu, quod nova qualitas differat numero ab ea cui adventi, et quod ipsa retineat distinctionem numericam, sed ita, ut omnes gradus eandum numero caritatem contineant.

SCHOLIUM

I. About the question of the *special* manner, by which charity is increased, we observe, that besides the two opinions posited in the text of St. Thomas, (Summa., II II, q. 24, a. 5; Sent., Bk. I, d. 17, a. 2, a. 2) he defends a third sentence, namely that charity is increased not through addition ,but through being more rooted [per radicationem maiorem] in the subject, to which Durandus (here in qq. 6 and 7) and (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian (here in q. 6) consent. — St. Bonaventure explains his own sentence more in Sent., Bk. II, d. 27, a. 2, q. 2, where besides the three improbable manners he brings forward three other probable ones and wisely concludes: « In whatsoever of these manners of the three following (opinions) it be said, one is not to make much of it [non est magna vis facienda], but (rather) having it as certain, that the grace of God can be increased in us, we ought to work in such a wise, that it increase in us through good works ». The sentence, which the Seraphic (Doctor) more favors, is also defended by Alexander of Hales, Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent and most of all by (Bl. John Duns) Scotus and very many later doctors. See more on this controversy in Rada, Controversies, n. 18, and Francesco Macedo, Collations, coll. 7, difference 3. Here let it suffice to say, that St. Bonaventure least of all understood the *addition of the new grades (of charity)* in that sense, that the new quality differs in number from that which is added to it, and that it retains a numeric distinction, but thus, that all the grades contain the same charity according to number.

II. Distinctio partium materialium et

II. The distinction of material and formal

formalium in solut. ad 3. sumta est ex libro Aristotelis, I. de Gener. text. 35. seq. (ed. Paris. c. 5.). Vocantur autem hic partes *materiales*, non quod sint sine forma, sed quia potius passivae quam activae sunt; aliae vero dicuntur *formales*, quia sunt maxime activae.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. n. 4. a. 2. § 1. 2.; et IV. q. 9. n. 3 a. 2. § 1. — S. Thom., locis citt. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodlib. 5. q. 19; 4. q. 15. — Biel, hic q. 5. et seq.

parts in the solution to n. 3 has been taken from Aristotle's book, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 35, (in the Parisian edition, ch. 5). Moreover here they are called *material* parts, not because they are without form, but because they are passive rather than active; but the others are called *formal*, because they are most of all active.

III. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 61, n. 4, a. 2, § 1 and 2; and p. IV, q. 9, m. 3, a. 2, § 1. — St. Thomas, locis. citt.. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in 1st. princ., q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals, 5, q. 19, 4, q. 15. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 5 and ff..

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[1] Cod. T *his*.
[2] Vat. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quae et mox post *se* addit *non*, sed obstat auctoritas mss. et ed. 1. Nota super, quod Vat. praefigendo numerum 5 exhibeat ea quae sequuntur tanquam responsionem ad quintam obiectionem, cum revera sint responsio ad aliquam propositionem quartae obiectionis. — Paulo infra ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *augmentum* pro *augmentationem*.
[3] Nonnulli codd. ut K V X ee non male *aut contingit*.
[4] In cod. M additur *et*. Mox post *formalis* in codd. M Y (H ff in margine) adiungitur *activi, proprie tamen loquendo, illud quod augmentat finaliter quantum ad terminum ipsius augmentationis se habet in ratione formalis*.

[1] Codex T reads *these* [his].
[2] The Vatican edition has *To that which is objected* [Ad illud quod obiicitur], and next reads *does it not hold* [non habet] for *does it hold* [habet], but the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 withstand these. Note above, that the Vatican edition, by prefixing the number 5 to this paragraph, exhibits those words which follow as a response to the fifth objection, when in fact they are the response to the other proposition of the fourth objection. — A little below this, form the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *augment* [augmentum] for *augmentation* [augmentationem].
[3] Not a few codices, such as K V X and ee, have not badly *or it happens* [aut contingit].
[4] In codex M there is added *and* [et]. Then after *of the formal* [formalis], in codices M and Y (H and ff in the margin) there is added *active, however properly speaking, that which augments finally as much as regards the terminus of the augmentation itself holds itself in the reckoning of the formal* [activi, proprie tamen loquendo, illud quod augmentat finaliter quantum ad terminum ipsius augmentationis se habet in ratione formalis].

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on

Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII.

PARS II.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio III.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 313-315.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

QUAESTIO III.

Utrum caritas possit diminui.

TERTIO QUARITUR, utrum caritas possit diminui. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per naturam *sui oppositi* sic: sicut dicit Augustinus:[5] « Venenum caritatis est cupiditas »; unde et dicit,[6] quod « ubi magna cupiditas, ibi parva caritas », et in libro Confessionum:[7] « Minus te amat, qui tecum aliquid amat, quod non propter te amat ». Si ergo contingit cupiditatem non tantum remitti, sed etiam augeri, per contrarium contingit caritatem diminui.

2. Item, veniale est malum; sed non est malum, nisi quod adimit aliquid de bono:[8] ergo veniale adimit alquid. Sed naturalis habilitas est multo maioris inhaerentiae quam caritas: ergo cum veniale adimat de bonitate naturali, ergo et de caritae; ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per naturam *sui subiecti*; quia sicut hominem contingit proficere, ita et[9] retrocedere; sed per profectum liberi arbitrii contingit in nobis caritatem augeri, dum ascenditur ad

the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVII

PART II

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 3

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 313-315.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUESTION 3

Whether charity can be diminished.

THIRD THERE IS ASKED, whether charity can be diminished. And it seems, that (it can) in this manner:

1. Through the nature if *its own opposite* thus: just as (St.) Augustine says:[5] « Charity's poison is cupidity »; whence he also says,[6] that « where great cupidity, there small charity », and in the book of The Confessions:[7] « He loves Thee less, who along with Thee loves anything, which he does not love for the sake of Thee ». If, therefore, it happens, that cupidity is not remitted, but only increased, contrariwise [per contrarium] it happens that charity is diminished.

2. Likewise, a venial (sin) is an evil; but evil is not, but what takes away [adimit] something of good:[8] therefore a venial (sin) takes something away. But a natural ability is of much greater inherence than charity: therefore since a venial (sin) takes away from natural goodness, therefore also from charity; ergo etc..

3. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown through the nature of *its own subject*; because just as it happens that a man makes progress, so also[9] that he recedes; but through the progress of free will

perfectionem: ergo cum contingat eisdem gradibus redire ad imperfectionem, contingit caritatem diminui.

[profectum liberi arbitrii] it happens that charity is increased in us, while there is an ascension [ascenditur] towards perfection: therefore since it happens that he goes backward [redire] by the same steps towards imperfection, it happens that charity is diminished.

[5] Libr. 83 Qq. q. 36. n. 1: « Caritatis autem venenum est spes adipiscendorum aut retinendorum termporalium ». Quae spes ab ipso paulo post nominatur *cupiditas*.
[6] Ibid. et Enchirid. c. 121. n. 32; vide supra q. praeced. corp. quaest. — Vat. post *unde* contra plurimos mss. et quinque primas edd. omittit *et*.
[7] Libr. X. c. 29. n. 40.
[8] August., Enchir. c. 12. n. 4: Nocet autem (malum), adimit igitur bonum. — Paulo ante cod. Z incongrue *quia* loco *quod*.
[9] Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit *et*.

[5] Book of 83 Questions, q. 36, n. 1: « But charity's poison is the hope of obtaining and retaining temporal (goods) ». Which hope is by the same a little after this named *cupidity*.
[6] Ibid., and Enchiridion, ch. 121, n. 32; see above q. 2 in the body of the question. — The Vatican edition after *whence* [unde], contrary to very many manuscripts and five first editions, omits *also* [et].
[7] Bk. X, ch. 29, n. 40.
[8] (St.) Augustine, Enchiridion., ch. 12, n. 4: But it (i. e. evil) injures, therefore it takes away (something) good. — A little before this codex Z incongruously has *because* [quia] in place of *what* [quod].
[9] The Vatican edition, breaking with very many manuscripts and edition 1, omits *also* [et].

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4. Item, omne illud quod sui dehabilitatione[1] in termino est causa corruptionis, per sui dehabilitationem citra terminum est causa diminutionis; sed liberum arbitrium dehabilitatum per aversionem est causa corruptionis caritatis: ergo dehabilitatio eius sub Deo causa diminutionis.[2]

4. Likewise, every thing [illud] which by disabling itself[1] in regard to (its) terminus (of movement) is the cause of (its own) corruption, through disabling itself before (its) terminus is the cause of (its own) diminution; but free will disabled through aversion (from God) is the cause of the corruption of charity: therefore a disabling less than God [sub Deo] (is) the cause of (charity's) [2] diminution.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per naturam *ipsius caritatis* sic: « opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem »;[3] sed augmentum et diminutio sunt opposita: ergo si contingit caritatem augeri, contingit et diminui.

5. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown through the nature of *charity itself* in this manner: « opposites are bound to come to be about the same (thing) »;[3] but an augment and a diminution are opposites: therefore if it happens that charity is increased, it happens that it is also diminished.

6. Item, quod potest salvari in esse[4] sine coniunctione sui ad aliquid, potest illud ab illo post coniunctionem separari; sed caritas ante additionem habet esse sine additamento: ergo potest[5] separari: et si hoc, ergo et diminui: ergo etc.

6. Likewise, that which can be conserved [salvari] in 'being'[4] without the conjunction of it to something, can be separated from it before the conjunction; but charity before addition has a 'being' without an addition [additamento]: therefore it can be separated:[5] and if this, therefore (it) also (can) be diminished: ergo etc..

Contra: 1. Caritas est forma simplex et uniformis per totum; ergo quod adimit de caritate, qua ratione adimit unam partem,

On the contrary: 1. Charity is a form, simple and uniform throughout [per totum]; therefore that which takes away from

adimit[6] et totum: et si hoc, ergo nunquam diminuitur.

charity, for the reason that it takes away one part, it takes away[6] also the whole: and if this, therefore it is never diminished.

2. Item, magnitudo caritatis est secundum magnitudinem divinae influentiae, ergo diminutio eius est per diminutionem influentiae; sed Deus non subtrahit influentiam suam nisi offensus, et non offenditur nisi per aversionem ab ipso et contemptum: ergo non diminuitur caritas nisi per peccatum mortale; sed hoc non est aliud quam caritatem tolli: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, the magnitude of charity is according to the magnitude of the Divine Influence, therefore its diminution is through a diminution of the influence; but God does not subtract His influence unless offended, and He is not offended except through aversion from Himself and contempt: therefore charity is not diminished except through mortal sin; but this is not other than (through) charity being taking away [tolli]: ergo etc..

3. Item, omne[7] quod diminuit alterum, est illi oppositum; sed veniale vel cupiditas sive concupiscentia citra Deum non opponitur caritati, immo est omnino illi contingens: ergo non diminuitur.

3. Likewise, everything [omne][7] which diminishes the other, is opposed to the other; but venial (sin) and/or cupidity or concupiscence in (something) on the way to [citra Deum] is not opposed to charity, nay it is entirely contingent with it: therefore it is not diminished.

4. Item, quod diminuit alterum habet posse super[8] illud; sed veniale non habet posse super caritatem, quia plus diligit caritas Deum, quam cupiditas centum marcas auri et argenti:[9] ergo etc.

4. Likewise, what diminishes the other has an ability [posse] over[8] it; but venial (sin) does not have an ability over charity, because charity loves God more, than cupidity (does) a hundred marks of gold and silver:[9] ergo etc..

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per impossibile hoc modo: si veniale diminuit caritatem, ergo aliquid diminuit ab ipsa: si ergo caritas non est infinitae magnitudinis, ergo veniale aliquoties iteratum totam adimit caritatem, quod falsum est.

5. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown through the impossible in this manner:: if a venial (sin) diminishes charity, therefore something diminishes from it: if, therefore, charity is not of an infinite magnitude, therefore a venial (sin) repeated several times takes away the whole charity, which is false.

6. Item, si diminuit caritatem secundum substantiam, ergo minuit praemium substantiale ei debitum; sed praemium substantiale est bonum aeternum: ergo veniale aliquid aufert de bono aeterno; sed ablatio boni aeterni vel simpliciter vel secundum partem est poena aeterna: ergo veniale meretur poenam aeternam, quod est contra communem opinionem. Si ergo veniale non minuit unum, nec aliud.

6. Likewise, if it diminishes charity according to substance, therefore it lessens the substantial reward due it; but the substantial reward is the Eternal Good: therefore a venial (sin) bears off something from the Eternal Good; but the ablation of the Eternal Good either simply and/or according to a part is the eternal punishment: therefore a venial (sin) merits eternal punishment, which is contrary to the common opinion. If, therefore, a venial (sin) does not lessen the one, neither the other.

CONCLUSIO.

Caritas, licet tollatur per peccatum mortale, tamen per peccatum veniale non minuitur secundum substantiam, sed tantum secundum fervorem.

CONCLUSION

Charity, though it is taken away through a mortal sin, however through a venial sin is not diminished according to substance, but only according to fervor.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex opinio est, fundata super duplicem opinionem praecedentem de modo augmentandi caritatem.[10] Quidam enim dicunt, caritatem augeri per impermixtionem; et cum *impermixtio* maior sit secundum maiorem liberi arbitrii habilitationem et secundum concupiscentiae diminutionem, et e contrario *permixtio* per dehabilitationem liberi arbitrii et[11] augmentationem concupiscentiae: dicunt per consequens, eam diminui, secundum quod augetur cupiditas vel concupiscentia et dehabilitatur liberum arbitrium; et hoc est per veniale peccatum. Sed quonian veniale peccatum, manens veniale, nunquam toties iteratur, quod concupiscentiam augeat,[12] ita quod aliquid diligat supra Deum: ideo caritas per venialia potest minui, sed non tolli; tollitur autem per mortale, quod auget concupiscentiam supra Deum.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that about this there is a twofold opinion, founded on the preceding, twofold opinion concerning the manner of augmenting charity.[10] For certain (authors) say, that chary is increased through a thorough unmingling; and since a more *thorough unmingling* is according to a greater enabling [habilitionem] of free will and according to the diminution of concupiscence, and contrariwise a *thorough mingling* through a disabling of free will and[11] the augmentation of concupiscence: they say, as a consequence [per consequens], that it is diminished, according to which cupidity and/or concupiscence is increased and free will is disabled; and this is through venial sin. But since venial sin, remaining venial sin, is never repeated so many times, that it increases concupiscence,[12] so that one loves something above God [supra Deum]. for that reason charity can be lessened through venial (sins), but not taken away; but it is taken away through mortal (sin), which increases concupiscence above God.

Sed haec opinio, ut supra probatum est,[13] non habet stabile fundamentum, quoniam substantiale augmentum caritatis non venit a libero arbitrio nec a concupiscentia,[14] ideo nec diminutio.

But this opinion, as has been proven above,[13] does not have a stable foundation, since a substantial augment of charity does not come from free will nor from concupiscence,[14] and for that reason neither a diminution.

Et propter hoc ponitur alia opinio probabilior, quod caritas non minuitur substantialiter; et haec opinio fundatur super hoc, quod augmentum caritatis fieri habet per additionem[15] vel incrementum maioris influentiae. Quo supposito dicendum, quod caritas secundum substantiam non minuitur, sed augetur.

And on this account there is posited the other, more probable opinion, that charity is not lessened substantially; and this opinion is founded on this, that the augment of charity has its coming to be through the addition[15] and/or an increase [incrementum] of a greater influence. Which having been supposed it must be said, that charity is not lessened according to substance, but it is increased.

Et ratio huius sumitur a part *oppositi* sive *agentis*. Nam caritas non habet oppositum nisi mortale peccatum, per illud autem non minuitur, sed . . .

And the reason for this is taken from the part of (its) *opposite* or *agent*. For charity does not have an opposite, except mortal sin, through which, however, it is not lessened, but (rather) . . .

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[1] Aliqui codd. ut X Z *per sui dehabilitationem*.
[2] Supple cum cod. F *caritatis*.
[3] Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). — Paulo ante plures codd. ut A S T W Z omittunt *caritatis*.
[4] Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. adiecimus *in esse*. Mox cod. Y *aliud* loco *aliquid*.
[5] Unus alterque cod. ut V ff cum ed. 1 addunt *ab illo*.

[1] Some codices, such as X and Z, read *through disabling itself* [per sui dehabilitationem].
[2] Supply together with codex F *charity's* [caritatis].
[3] Aristotle, On Predicaments, ch. "on Opposites", and Topics, Bk. II, ch. 3 (ch. 7). — A little before this very many codices, such as A S T W and Z, omit *charity* [caritatis].
[4] Trusting in the manuscripts and six of the first

[6] In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest *adimit*.
[7] Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 addit *illud*. Paulo post plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 habent *opponuntur* loco *opponitur*, sed non cohaerenter cum subnexis.
[8] Multi codd. hic et paulo infra *supra*.
[9] Fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent hanc abbreviationem: c. m. a. ar.; cod. O integre lectionem in textum receptam praebet, dum cod. Y (H et ee ab altera manu) ponit *aurum et argentum*; Vat. vero *creaturam*.
[10] Vide q. praeced.
[11] Cod. Z addit *per*.
[12] Cod. V *concupiscentia augeatur*. Paulo post plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *diminui* loco *minui*,* et dein cod. X *quia* pro *quod*.
[13] In corp. praeced q.
[14] Intellige iuxta praedicta: non venit a liberi arbitrii habitatione in bono nec a concupiscentiae diminutione. Mendum Vat., quod post *arbitrio* ponit *ideo* et mox *ideo nec* omittit, correximus ex mss. et edd. 1, 4, 5, 6.
[15] Aliqui codd. ut I L O cum ed. 1 *superadditionem*, quae lectio corrobatur lectione mutila plurimum codd. ponentium *super* loco *per*. Mox ed. 1 *sive* pro *vel*.

* Nota originalis legivit *minui* loco *diminui*, sed perperam quia contra textum criticalem supra.

editions, we have inserted *in 'being'* [in esse]. Next codex Y has *another* [aliud] in place of *something* [aliquid].
[5] One or the other codex, such as V and ff, together with edition 1, adds *from that (addition)* [ab illo].
[6] In very many manuscripts and edition 1 there is lacking *it takes away* [adimit].
[7] The Vatican edition, contrary to very many codices and to edition 1, reads *every 'that'* [omne illud]. A little after this very many codices, together with edition 1, have *are opposed* [opponuntur] in place of *is opposed* [opponitur], but not coherently with what is subjoined.
[8] Many codices here and a little below this read *above* [supra].
[9] Nearly all the codices together with edition 1 exhibit this abbreviation: c. m. a. ar.; codex O offers the full text received, while codex Y (H and ee by the other hand) puts *gold and silver* [aurum et argentum]; but the Vatican edition reads *a creature* [creaturam] for *a hundred marks of silver and gold* [centum marcas auri et argenti].
[10] See the preceding question.
[11] Codex Z adds *through* [per].
[12] Codex V reads *that concupiscence is increased* [quod concupiscentia augeatur]. A little after this very many codices, together with edition 1, have *diminished* in place of *lessened*,* and then codex X has *because* [quia] for *which* [quod].
[13] In the body of the preceding question.
[14] Understand this according to the aforesaid proposition: does not come from the enabling of free will in good nor from the diminution of concupiscence. The fault of the Vatican edition, which after *will* [arbitrio] puts *for that reason* [ideo] and then omits *for that reason neither* [ideo nec], we have corrected from the manuscripts and from editions 1, 4, 5, and 6.
[15] Some codices, such a I L and O, together with edition 1, read *super-addition* [superadditionem], which reading is corroborated by the mutilated reading of very many codices, which put *over* [super] in place of *through* [per]. Next edition 1 has *or* [sive] for *and/or* [vel].

* The original note read *lessened* in place of *diminished*, but faultily because contrary to the critical text above.

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tollitur; concupiscentia autem sive cupiditas et veniale peccatum opponuntur caritati secundum fervorum solum, quia simul stant et substantialiter sunt sese incontingentia.[1]

1. 2. Et ideo solvendum ad duo prima, quod illud Augustini de cupiditate et minori amore, similiter[2] illud de veniali diminutione locum habet solum quantum ad fervorem caritatis; et sic patent duo prima.

taken away; but concupiscence or cupidity and venial sin are opposed to charity according to fervor alone, because they stand together and are substantially incontingent[1] to themselves.

1. 2. And for that reason it must be solved according to the first two, because that (saying of St.) Augustine concerning cupidity and a lesser love [amore], (and) similarly[2] that concerning a venial diminution has a place only as much as

regards the fervor of charity, and thus the first two are clear.

Sumitur etiam ratio, quare caritas non minuitur a parte *ipsius subiecti*, quod est liberum arbitrium secundum conversionem ad Deum. Liberum autem[3] arbitrium ad augmentum caritatis se disponit per habilitatem, similiter ad diminutionem per dehabilitatem citra mortale. Sed haec dispositio est de congruo, non de condigno; et quoniam Deus est pronior ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum, et ad donandum quam ad subtrahendum:[4] hinc est, quod caritatem tribuit, cum se liberum arbitrium disponit de congruo, sed non subtrahit, nisi quando necessario se disponit ad subtractionem gratiae. Hoc autem solum est per aversionem, et tunc totum tollit. Et hinc est, quod caritas nunquam minuitur, sed augetur, quia solum de congruo potest se praeparare subiectum ad diminutionem.

There is also accepted [sumitur] the reason, why charity is not lessened on the part of *its subject*, because there is free will according to (it's) conversion to God. Moreover,[3] free will disposes itself for the augment of charity through an ability, similarly for a diminution (of charity) through a disability (which is) less than a mortal (sin). But this disposition is de congruo (i. e. from something congruous), not de condigno (i. e. from something completely worthy); and since God is more prone to be merciful than to condemn, and to grant than to subtract.[4] hence it is, that He bestows charity, when free will disposes itself de congruo, but does not subtract (it), except when it necessarily disposes itself to a subtraction of grace. But this alone is through aversion, and then He taken the whole (of its substance) away. And hence it is, that charity is never lessened, but it is increased, because a subject can only prepare itself de congruo for a diminution.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut homo proficit, ita descendit[5] frequenter; dicendum, quod non sic diminuitur per descensum substantialiter caritas, sicut augetur per ascensum.

3. To that which is objected, that just as a man makes progress, so does he frequently descend;[5] it must be said, that substantially charity is not in the same manner diminished through a descent, just as it is increased through an ascent.

4. Quod etiam[6] obiicit, quod liberum arbitrium potest totum privare per dehabilitationem etc.; dicendum, quod istud falsum est, quia forma substantialis omnino privatur per dispositionem ad oppositum in termino, non tamen minuitur per dispositionem citra[7] terminum. *Praeterea*, illud habet locut, quando dispositio in termino et citra terminum sunt eiusdem generis; non sic autem est in proposito, quia una est mortale peccatum, alia veniale.

4. Because it also[6] objects, that it can deprive free will entirely [totum] through a disabling etc.; it must be said, that that is false, because a substantial form is entirely deprived through a disposition to the opposite in the terminus (of movement), it is not, however, lessened through a disposition before[7] the terminus. *Besides*, that has a place, when the disposition in the terminus and before the terminus are of the same genus; but it is not so in the proposed (objection), because one (disposition) is a mortal sin, the other a venial one.

Sumitur etiam ratio, quare[8] non potest minui, a parte *naturae suae*. Ipsa enim est influentia secundum divinam acceptationem; sed quod Deus acceptet,[9] hoc est ab ipso et ita, quod magis et magis acceptet, et ita de sui natura potest augeri; quod autem minus acceptet, hoc non est ex se: ergo oportet quod veniat a nobis: ergo caritas de se habet augeri, minui vero non habet nisi a nobis, ut supra ostensum est.[10]

There is also accepted [sumiter], why (charity)[8] cannot be lessened, on the part of *its own nature*. For (charity) itself is an influence according to the Divine Acceptance; but what God accepts,[9] this is from [ab] Himself and thus, what (has) more He also accepts more, and thus it can be increased from its own nature; but what He accepts less, this is not out of Himself: therefore it is necessary [oportet] that it

Per nos autem non potest minui, et ideo caritati solum debetur augmentum naturaliter.

come from us: therefore charity has a 'being increased' of itself, but a 'being lessened' it does not have except from us, as has been shown above.[10] But through us it can be lessened, and for that reason only an augment is due to charity according to its nature [naturaliter].

5. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod opposita nata sunt etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, nisi alterum insit per naturam.

5. To that, therefore, which is objected, what opposites are bound to be etc.; it must be said, that it is true, unless the other one is in (it) through nature.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur: potest esse sine additione, ergo separari; dicendum, quod istud verum est, si esset aliquid separans, sed nihil est quod separat.

6. To that which is objected: it can be without addition, therefore (it can) be separated; it must be said, that that is true, if it there were something separating (them), but there is nothing which separates (them).

SCHOLION.

Ex antiquis Antissiodorensis et etiam, quod mirum est, Dionys. Carth. affirmarunt, caritatem secundum habitum minui posse, quod nunc communissime negatur. — Alex. Hal. S. p. II. q. 108. n. 8. § 3. — Scot., Report. hic q. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 5; S. II. II. q. 24. a. 10. — Guilielmus Par., de Virtut. c. 11. ante med. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 5. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. unica. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 23. — Durand., hic q. 10. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 9. — Biel, hic q. 4.

SCHOLIUM

Of the ancient (scholastics Peter) of Auxerre and even, what is remarkable, (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian affirm, that charity according to habit can be lessened, which now is most commonly denied. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 108, n. 8, § 3. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Reportatio., here in q. 7. — St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 5; Summa. II II, q. 24, a. 10. — William of Paris, On the Virtues, c. 11, before the middle. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 10. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 5. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 5. — Giles the Roman, here in 2nd. princ., q. sole. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals., 5, q. 23. — Durandus, here in q. 10. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 9. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 4.

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[1] Licet lectio Vat. et aliquorum mss., in qua ponitur *contingentia* loco *incontingentia*, possit aliquo sub respectu explicari, praeferimus tamen lectionem plurimorum mss. et ed. 1, quia ipsa veritati et praedictis magis consonat. Paulo ante cod. Z *tantum* loco *solum*.

[2] Fide antiquiorum codd. et ed. 1 expunximus hic male additum *ad*. Mox codd. Y bb bene *venialis* pro *veniali*.

[3] Plures codd. ut A T V Y omittunt *autem*; cod. X *quia liberum arbitrium*; cod. Z vero, mutata interpunctione, *Secundum enim conversionem ad Deum liberum arbitrium*, quod non respondet subnexis. Mox cod. W *habilitationem* pro *habilitatem*, sicut et paulo infra *dehabilitationem* loco *dehabilitatem*.

[4] Vat. cum cod. cc *abstrahendum* et mox *abstrahit* pro *subtrahit*, deinde nomini *substractionem* praemittit *abstractionem vel*, sed obstat usus

[1] Though the reading of the Vatican edition and of the other manuscripts, in which there is put *contingent* [contingentia] in place of *incontingent* [incontingentia], can be explained under some respect, we, however, prefer the reading of the very many manuscripts and edition 1, because they are more consonant with the truth itself and the aforesaid (propositions). A little before this codex Z reads *only* [tantum] in place of *alone* [solum].

[2] Trusting in the more ancient codices and edition 1, we have expunged the here badly added *to* [ad]. Next codices Y and bb read well *concerning the diminution of a venial (sin)* [de venialis diminutione]

[3] Very many codices, such as A T V and Y, omit *Moreover* [autem]; codex X reads *Because free will* [quia liberum arbitrium]; codex Z, however, with a changed punctuation, reads *For according to (its) conversion to God free will* [Secundum enim conversionem ad Deum liberum arbitrium], which

loquendi, sicut et auctoritas antiquiorum mss. cum ed. 1. Mox cod. W *non ad gratiam* pro *gratiae*.

[5] Ex mss. et quinque primis edd. pro *retrocedit* substituimus *descendit*, quod subnexis conformius est.

[6] Vat. cum nonnullis codd. *autem*, et *obiicitur* pro *obiicit*.

[7] Multi codd. ut A B C D F G I P Q S U W Z *intra*, sed non bene nec cohaerenter cum subnexis. Quid sit dispositio *in termino* et *citra terminum*, satis apparet ex hic verbis S. Thomae (IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 5. solutio ad quaestiunc. 3.): « Explusio formae dicit terminum motus illius, qui est ad corruptionem ordinatus; et introductio formae dicit similiter terminum motus illius, qui praecedit generationem; quia tam generatio quam corruptio sunt termini motus. Omne autem quod movetur, quando est in termino motus, disponitur secundum illud, ad quod motus ordinatur; et ideo cum motus corruptionis tendat in non esse, generationis vero ad esse, quando forma introducitur, forma est; quando autem expellitur, non est ».

[8] Supple: caritas.

[9] Plures codd. ut A F G H I T Y bb cum ed. 1 hanc propositionem ita exhibent *secundum quod Deus acceptat*, cui codd. V X praefigunt *id est*; cod. T vero mox post *hoc* addit *autem*. Paulo infra antiquiorum mss.et edd. 1, 3, fide substituimus *sui* pro *sua*.

[10] Hic, in corp. quaest. — Mox ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *solum*, pro quo cod. Z habet *soli* et quod Vat. cum cod. cc male omittit.

does not respond to the subjoined. Next codex W has *enabling* [habilitationem] for *ability* [habiliatem], just as also a little below this it reads *disabling* [dehabilitationem] in place of *disability* [dehabilitatem].

[4] The Vatican edition together with codex cc has *withdraw* [abstrahendum] and next *withdraw* [abstrahit] for *subtract* [substrahit], then to the noun *a subtraction* [subtractionem] it prefixes *a withdrawal and/or* [abstractionem vel], but the manner of speech (of the Seraphic Doctor) withstands this, just as also the authority of the more ancient manuscripts, together with edition 1. Next codex W has *not according to grace* [non ad gratiam] for *of grace* [gratiae].

[5] From the manuscripts and five first editions, we have substituted *descend* [descendit] for *recedes* [retrocedit], which is more conformable with the subjoined.

[6] The Vatican edition, together with not a few codices, reads *Moreover, because it is objected* [Quod autem obiicitur].

[7] Many codices, such as A B C D F G I P Q S U W and Z, read *within* [intra], but not well nor coherently with the subjoined. What a disposition *in a terminus* and *before a terminus* is, will sufficiently appear from these words of St. Thomas (Sent., Bk. IV, d. 17, q. 1, a. 5, solution to questiuncula 3): « The expulsion of a form means the terminus of movement of that, which has been ordered to corruption; and the introduction of a form means similarly the terminus of movement of that, which precedes generation; because both generation and corruption are the termini of a movement. But everything which is moved, when it is in the terminus of (its) movement, is disposed according to that, to which the movement is ordered, and for that reason since the movement of corruption tends unto ‘not being’ [in non esse], but (that) of corruption to ‘being’ [ad esse], when a form is introduced, there is a form; but when it is expelled, it is not ».

[8] Supply: charity.

[9] Very many codices, such as A F G H I T Y and bb, together with edition 1, exhibit this proposition thus, *according to which God accepts (it)* [secundum quod Deus acceptat], to which codices V and X prefix *that is* [id est]; codex T, however, next reads *but this* [hoc autem]. A little below this, trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and editions 1 and 3, we have substituted *its own* [sui] for *its own* [sua].

[10] Here, in the body of the question. — Next with the help of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied *only* [solum], but codex Z reads *to charity alone* [soli . . . caritati]; but the Vatican edition together with codex cc badly omit it altogether.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII.

PARS II.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio IV.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 316-318.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

QUAESTIO IV.

Utrum caritas terminum habeat in augmento.

QUARTO QUARITUR et ultimo de augmento caritatis quantum ad terminum, et quaeritur, utrum habeat statum vel terminum, ultra quem non possit augeri. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Omne quod est in aliquo, non excedit capacitatem eius in quo est; sed caritas est in anima: ergo non excedit animae capacitatem. Sed capacitas animae est finita, quia omnis potentia finita habet capacitatem finitam: ergo et caritas.

2. Item, augmentum caritatis attenditur secundum quantitatem *virtutis*; sed quantitas virtutis similis est quantitati *molis* et perfectior; sed in quantitate *molis* in augmentando est status, unde Philosophus:[1] « Omnium natura constantium terminus est et ratio

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVII

PART II

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 4

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 316-318.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUESTION 4

Whether charity has a terminus in (its) augment.

FOURTH AND LAST there is asked concerning the augment of charity as much as regards (its) terminus, and there is asked, whether it has a standing-still [status] and/or terminus, beyond which it cannot be increased. And that it does [sic], is shown in this manner:

1. Everything which is in something, does not exceed the capacity of that in which it is; but charity is in the soul: therefore it does not exceed the capacity of the soul. But the capacity of the soul is finite, because every finite power [potentia] has a finite capacity: therefore also charity.

2. Likewise, an augment of charity is attained according to a quantity of *virtue*; but a quantity of virtue is similar to a quantity of *mass* and more perfect (than it); but in a quantity of *mass* there is a standing-still in it being augmented, whence the Philosopher (says):[1] « The nature of all

magnitudinis et augmenti »; ergo similiter et in quantitate *virtutis*.

3. Item, augmentum caritatis attenditur per ascensum ad quantitatem perfectam,[2] ergo quod semper augetur nunquam venit ad perfectum, « perfectum autem est, cui non est possibilis additio »;[3] sed caritatem, cum sit opus Dei, contingit perfici, *Dei enim perfecta sunt opera*:[4] ergo etc.

4. Item, augmentum caritatis attenditur secundum approximationem ad finem, nam quanto caritas maior tanto fini proximior;[5] ergo aut nunquam pervenit ad finem, aut si sic, necesse est stare, quia alias esset frustra: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Quod non sit status, ostenditur a parte *virtutis augmentantis*. Tantum enim extenditur augmentum, quantum virtus augmentativa; sed virtus augmentans caritatem est virtus divina, quae non habet terminum nec[6] statum: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur[7] a parte *suscipientis*. Sicut enim se habet transparens ad lumen corporale, sic capacitas animae ad lumen gratiae sive caritatis; sed aër nunquam tantum recipit de lumine, quin adhuc possit plus recipere: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc videtur posse ostendi a parte *augmentabilis*, quod est caritas, quia ipsa est aeque in actu vel amplius quam[8] ignis materialis: sed ignis materialis ratione suae actualitatis augetur in infinitum, si adsit combustibile, sicut dicit Philosophus:[9] ergo similiter caritas de se.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte *obiecti caritatis*, quod est summum bonum non habens mensuram: ergo si mensura caritatis debet attendi per[10] magnitudinem obiecti, et illud caret modo et mensura, ergo et caritas: et si hoc, ergo non habet statum nec terminum.

constants is a terminus and a reckoning of magnitude and of augment »; therefore similarly also in a quantity of *virtue*.

3. Likewise, an augment of charity is attained through an ascent to a perfect quantity,[2] therefore what is always being increased [augetur] never comes to a perfect (state), « but the perfect is, that to which an addition is not possible »;[4] but it happens that charity, since it is a work of God, is perfected, *for the works of God have been perfected*:[4] ergo etc..

4. Likewise, an augment of charity is attained according to an approach [aproximationem] to (its) end, for as much as charity (is) greater, so much (is it) nearer to (its) end;[5] therefore either it never arrives at (its) end, or if so, it is necessary that it stand still, because otherwise (the end) would be as a trick: ergo etc..

On the contrary: 1. That there is no standing still, is shown on the part of the *augmenting virtue*. For as much as the augment is extended, so much the augmentative virtue; but the virtue augmenting charity is a divine virtue, which does not have a terminus nor[6] a standing still: ergo etc..

2. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown[7] on the part of the *one taking it up*. For just as (something) transparent holds itself to a corporal light, so the capacity of the soul to the light of grace or of charity; but the air never receives so much from a light, that it still cannot receive more: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, this seems to be able to be shown on the part of the *augmentable*, which is charity, because it itself is equally and/or more fully in act than[8] material fire: but material fire by reason of its own actuality is increased in an unlimited manner [in infinitum], if (something) combustible is present, just as the Philosopher says:[9] therefore, in a similar manner charity from itself.

4. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown on the part of the *object of charity*, which is the most high Good, not having a measure: therefore if a measure of charity ought to be attained through[10] the magnitude of (its) object, and that lacks a standard of measure [modo] and a measure, therefore also charity: and if this, therefore it does

not have a standing still nor a terminus (in its augment).

CONCLUSIO.

Caritas habet terminum in augmento, quod colligitur ex parte tum virtutis agentis, tum potentiae suscipientis, tum formae perficientis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod status est in augmento caritatis secundum omnem modum, secundum quem contingit esse statum et perfectionem in motu augmenti.

Augmentum enim, sicut patet in corporalibus, habet statum a tribus: videlicet a *virtute agente* et *potentia suscipiente* et *forma perficiente*. Sic[11] est in homine, cuius augmentum stat, quando *virtus* caloris et carnis secundum speciem non potest amplius convertere, quam deperdatur; quando *potentia* humidi radicalis non potest plus extendi:[12] quando . . .

CONCLUSION

Charity has a terminus in its augment, which is gathered as much as on the part of the acting virtue, as of the power taking it up, as of the perfecting form.

I respond: It must be said, that there is a standing still in the augment of charity according to every standard of measure, according to which it happens that there is a standing still and perfection in a movement of increase.

For an augment, just as is clear in corporal (things), has a standing still from three (things): namely from the *acting virtue*, and *the power taking it up* and *the perfecting form*. So[11] it is in man, whose augment stands still, when the *virtue* of warmth and of the flesh according to (his) species cannot circulate [convertere] more fully, than be lost; when the *power* of the radical humor [humidi radicalis] cannot be more extended:[12] when . . .

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[1] Libr. II. de Anima text. 41. (c. 4.). — Paulo ante cod. S cum ed. 1 *augmento* pro *augmentando*. Mox post *similiter* ex multis mss. ut A G H I T W X etc. et ed. 1 substituimus *et* loco *est*.
[2] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *accessionem ad caritatem perfectam*; multi codd. ut A C F G I L P Q R S T U W etc. cum edd. 3, 6 *qualitatem* loco *quantitatem*, sed in se minus bene et contra ea quae in corp. quaestionis circa finem habentur. Codd. aa bb *et perfectionem* pro *perfectam*; aliqui codd. ut K X cum edd. 2, 3 *ascensionem* loco *ascensum*.
[3] Aristot.; vide supra q. 2. ad 3. — Mox ed. 1 cum aliquibus mss. expresse et bene *contingit* loco *convenit*.
[4] Deut. 32, 4.
[5] Sub hoc respectu ait Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (VI. c. 16.): Et enim secundum quod habent finem, perfecta dicuntur. — Mox ex aliquibus mss. ut M T Y Z adiecimus primum *aut*.
[6] Substituimus ope antiquiourm mss. et ed. 1 *nec* loco *et*.
[7] Vat. cum cod. cc *videtur*, sed ceteris mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus.
[8] Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 posuimus *quam* loco *sicut*.
[9] Libr. II. de Anima text 41. (c. 4.): Ignis enim augmentum in infinitum est, quousque fuerit combustibile.
[10] Ed. 1 *secundum*.
[11] Aliquid codd. ut K Y cc cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *sicut*; cod. Z *et sic*. Mox cod. K post *stat* addit *a tribus scilicet*.
[12] Quid sit humidum radicale secundum opinionem

[1] On the Soul, Bk. II, text 41 (ch. 4). — A little before this codex S, together with edition 1, has *in the augment* [augmento] for *in it being augmented* [augmentando]. Next after *similarly* [similiter], we have substituted, out of many manuscripts, such as A G H I T W X etc., and from edition 1, *also* [et] in place of *is it* [est].
[2] The Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition, has *through an approach to perfect charity* [per accessionem ad caritatem perfectam]; many codices, such as A C F G I L P Q R S T U W etc., together with edition 3 and 6, have *quality* [qualitatem] in place of *quantity* [quantitatem], but in itself less well and contrary to those things which are had in the body of the question near the end. Codices aa and bb read *to quantity and to perfection* [ad quantitatem et perfectionem]; some codices, such as K and X, together with editions 2 and 3, read *an ascension* [ascensionem] for *an ascent* [ascensum].
[3] Aristotle; see above q. 2, in reply to n. 3. — Next edition 1, together with some manuscripts, expressly and well, has *happens that charity . . . is perfected* [caritatem . . . contingit] in place of *it befits charity . . . to be perfected* [caritatem . . . convenit].
[4] Deut. 32:4.
[5] In this respect Aristotle says, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 21, (Bk. VI, ch. 16): For according to which they have (their) end, they are said (to be perfected). — Next out of some manuscripts, such as M T Y and Z, we have inserted the next *either* [aut].
[6] We have substituted, with the help of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, *nor* [nec] in place

illius aetatis explicat Scotus, I. Phys. q. 10. n. 23: « Unde nota secundo, quod duplex est humidum, radicale scilicet et cibale. Radicale non est in aliqua parte corporis determinata, sed est sparsum per totum corpus estque tota illa materia corporea, in qua introducitur anima in initio generationis, in qua anima fovetur et radicatur, cuius virtute postea reliqua efficiunut in corpore. Et hoc humido durante, durat vita et consumto, consumitur, et recedit anima. Humidum cibale seu nutrimentale est quod fit ex cibo per conversionem eius in substantiam aliti, ad reparandum quod deperditur ex humido radicali per actionem caloris naturalis. Nam licet calor naturalis praecipue resideat in corde, quod est omnium membrorum calidissimum, ab eo tamen derivatur in ceteras partes corporis estque sparsus per totum corpus et immersus humido radicali, in quibus actione sua consumitur, atque adeo, ne consumatur, necesse est, quod continue reparetur per intus susceptinem extrinseci alimenti » etc. — Paulo ante cod. K cum ed. 1 *amplius* loco *plus*. Paulo infra cod. M *operationi* pro *perfectioni*.

of *and* [et].

[7] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has *is seen* [videtur], but breaking with all the other manuscripts and with edition 1.

[8] Trusting in very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have put *than* [quam] in place of *just as* [sicut].

[9] On the Soul, Bk. II, text 41 (ch. 4): For the augment of fire is in an unlimited manner, so long as there will be (something) combustible.

[10] Edition 1 reads *according to* [secundum].

[11] Some codices, such as K K and cc, together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 5, read *just as* [sicut]; codex Z *and so* [et sic]. Next codex K after *stands still* [stat] adds *from three (things), namely* [a tribus scilicet].

[12] What a radical humor is according to the opinion of that age (Bl. John Duns) Scotus explains, Physics, Bk. I, q. 10, n. 23: « Wherefore, note second, that there is a twofold humor, namely the radical and (that) of food. The radical is not fixed within the limits of [determinate in] any part of the body, but is scattered throughout the whole body and is in the whole corporeal matter, in which the soul is introduced at the beginning of generation, in which the soul is fostered and rooted, by the virtue of which afterwards the remaining humors [reliqua] are wrought in the body. And as long as this humor endures, life endures and with it consumed, (life) is consumed, and the soul departs. The humor of food or nourishment is that which comes to be out of food through is conversion into the substance of the one nourished [substantiam aliti], to repair what has been lost from the radical humor through the action of natural warmth. For though the natural warmth resides chiefly in the heart, which is the warmest of all the members, yet from there it is channeled into all the other parts of the body and is scattered throughout the whole body and immersed in the radical humor, in which (parts) it is consumed by its own action, and to the extent, that it is not consumed, it is necessary, that it be continually repaired through the internal taking up of extrinsic alimentation ». A little before this codex K together with edition 1 has *more fully* [amplius] for *more* [plus]. A little after this codex M has *operation* [operationi] for *perfection* [perfectioni].

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corpus perfectum est, secundum quod congruit perfectioni animae.

the body has been *perfected*, according to what is congruent with the perfection of the soul.

Sic dicendum, quod caritas stat a part *virtutis agentis*; sed huiusmodi status potest esse dupliciter.[1] Nam illa virtus aut est operans *naturaliter*, aut a *proposito*; si *naturaliter*, tunc stat, quando non potest amplius; si *a proposito*, tunc sat, quando non disponit amplius; et hoc modo stat caritatis augmentum, cum deventum est ad mensuram, quam mensus est Deus homini secundum distributionem suae sapientiae.

So it must be said, that charity stands still on the part of the *acting virtue*, but a standing still of this kind can be in a twofold manner.[1] For that virtue is either operating *naturally*, or from *design* [proposito]; if *naturally*, then it stands still, when it can not be more full; if *from design*, then it stands still, when it does not more fully dispose; and in this manner the augment of charity stands still, when it has arrived [deventum

Et ideo, quamvis[2] virtus augmentans sit infinita, tamen operatur secundum dispositionem sapientiae limitantis effectus varios, secundum quod sibi placet. Non enim operatur secundum omnimodam possibilitatem.

est] at (its) measure, which God has measured [mensus est] for a man according to the distribution of His Wisdom. And for that reason, although[2] the augmenting virtue is infinite, yet it works according to the disposition of Wisdom, limiting (its) various effects, according to which it is pleased. For He does not work according to (His) omnimodal possibility.

Stat enim a parte *suscipientis*, quia sicut dicitur Matthaei vigesimo quinto:[3] *Dedit unicuique secundum propriam virtutem*. Et huiusmodi status potest intelligi tripliciter: aut secundum *actum*, cum amplius non procedit, et sic stat in viris perfectis, qui non assurgunt ad maiora; aut secundum *aptitudinem*, et sic stat in beatis, quia amplius non possunt se disponere et tantum habent, quantum se disposuerunt, unde status est in eis; aut secundum *possibilitatem* suscipientis, et sic statum habet in Christo,[4] et credo etiam, quod in beata Virgine, et aliqui dicunt, quod in Angelis; utrum in aliquibus aliis, nescio. Scio tamen de Christo, quod[5] tantum habet de gloria, quantum potest recipere creatura unita, et credo hoc ipsum de Matre dulcissima.

For (charity) stands still on the part of *the one taking it up*, because just as there is said in the twenty-fifth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) Matthew:[3] *He has given to each one according to their own virtue*. And a standing still of this kind can be understood in a threefold manner: either according to *act*, when (charity) does not proceed more fully, and in this manner it stands still in perfect men [viris], who do not rise up to greater (things); or according to *aptitude*, and in this manner it stands still in the blessed, because they cannot dispose themselves more fully and as much as they have, so much have they disposed themselves, whence there is a standing still in them; or according to the *possibility* of the one taking it up, and in this manner (charity) had a standing still in Christ,[4] and I believe also, that (thus it was) in the Blessed Virgin, and some say, that (it was thus also) in the Angels; whether in some others, I do not know. However I do know concerning Christ, that[5] He has as much of glory, as a united creature can receive, and I believe this very (thing) of (His) Most Sweet Mother.

Stat enim a parte *augmentabilis*, cum pervenit[6] ad quantitatem perfectam. Sed notandum, quod quantitas virtutis perfecta est dupliciter: vel *simpliciter*, vel *in genere*. *Simpliciter* perfecta est in summo et simplicissimo, ut in Deo; *in genere* vero in omnibus, qui[7] pertingunt ad actum completum, ad quem sunt, et hoc est *diligere Deum ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota virtue*.[8] Primo modo non est status, sed secundo solum.

For (charity) stands still on the part of *the augmentable*, when it arrives [pervenit][6] at the perfect quantity. But it must be noted, that the perfect quantity of a virtue is in a twofold manner: either *simply*, and/or *in genere*. *Simply* the perfect (quantity of charity) is in the most high and most simple (act), as (it is) in God; however *in genere* (it is) in all (the acts), which[7] stretch out to the complete act, for which they are, and this is *to love God with one's whole heart and with one's whole soul and with all one's virtue*.[8] In the first manner there is not a standing still, but only in the second.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur primo de infinitate *virtutis agentis*, dicendum, quod illa ratio teneret, si virtus caritatem augmentans ageret naturaliter et secundum impetum

1. To that which is objected first concerning the infinity of *the acting virtue*, it must be said, that that reason would hold, if the virtue augmenting charity acts naturally and

sive secundum totum suum posse; nunc autem agit sapienter et ita ponit unicuique limitem, ipsa in se non limitata.

according to the impetus or according to its own, whole ability [posse]; but now (this divine virtue) acts wisely and thus puts a limit upon each one, (though) it itself in itself not limited.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur *per simile* in aëre, quod suscipientis potentia est ad infinitum; dicendum, quod *lumen augeri in aëre* hoc est dupliciter: vel per ipsius *clarificationem*, vel per *luminum aggregationem*. Primo modo credo quod statum[9] habeat; adeo enim posset aër illuminari, quod si etiam superveniret aliud lumen, non magis claresceret. Alio modo potest augeri lumen in aëre per *luminum aggregationem*; et sic, quia lumina diversorum luminarium sunt in eodem puncto aëris, non se coangustant[10] nec se expellunt, sicut multae species in uno medio; et ita nunquam sunt tot species, quin plures possint esse; similiter de luminibus. Sed tunc non est simile de caritate, quoniam, sicut prius tactum est,[11] in una anima una tantum est caritas; non sic est de lumine, quod egreditur a diversis luminaribus.

2. To that which is objected *through (what is) similar* in the air, that the potency of the one taking it up is according to an infinite degree [ad infinitum], it must be said, that '*that a light in the air be increased*', this is in a twofold manner: either through its *being made bright* [clarificationem], and/or through *the aggregation of lights*. In the first manner I believe that it has a standing still;[9] for air could be illuminated to such an extent, that even if another light would come upon it, it would not grow more bright. In the other manner light in the air can be increased through *the aggregation of lights*; and thus, because the lights of diverse luminaries are in the same point of the air, they do not constrict [coangustant][10] themselves nor expel themselves, just as many species (do) in one medium; and thus there are never so many species, that there cannot be more; similarly of lights. But then it is not similar concerning charity, since, just as has been touched upon before,[11] in one soul there is only one charity; not so is it concerning the light, which steps forth form diverse luminaries.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur a parte *augmentabilis*, quod ignis in infinitum est augmentabilis; dicendum, quod calor potest augeri dupliciter: vel *intensive*, et sic statum habet et summum; vel *extensive*,[12] ut sit in pluribus, et sic non habet statum a parte sua, sed a parte combustibilis, quod finitum est. Similiter dico, quod caritas potest augeri *intensive*, ut magis diligat, et sic habet statum, sicut ignis; alio modo *extensive*, ut a parte dilectorum, et sic non habet statum ex parte sua, quia nunquam tot diligit, quin adhuc nata sit diligere plures.

3. To that which is objected on the part of the *augmentable*, that fire is augmentable in an unlimited manner; it must be said, that warmth can be increased in a twofold manner: either *intensively*, and thus it has a standing still and a most high (degree): and/or *extensively*,[12] so that it is in very many (things), and thus it does not have a standing still on its own part, but on the part of the combustible, which is finite. Similarly, I say, that charity can be increased *intensively*, so that one loves more, and in this manner it has a standing still, just as fire (does); in the other manner *extensively*, as on the part of (things) loved, and in this manner it does not have a standing still on its own part, because (charity) never loves so many, that it is bound [nata est] not to love still more.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur a parte *obiecti*,[13] dicendum, quod obiectum nihil ad hoc facit, quia obiectum semper est idem non mutatum et est infinitum; et ideo nunquam

4. To that which is objected on the part of the *object*,[13] it must be said, that the object causes nothing regarding this, because the Object is also the same unchanged [non

ei caritas commensuratur nec ad eius mensuram[14] recipit augmentum nec decrementum.

mutatum] and is infinite; and for this reason charity is never commensurate with It nor does it receive an augment according to Its measure,[14] nor a decrease [decrementum].

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[1] Aliqui codd.ut X Y *duplex*. Paulo ante ed. 1 *huius* loco *huiusmodi*. De proxime sequenti divisione virtutis operantis cfr. Aristot., I. Magn. Moral. c. 16. (17.), ubi de □□□□□□□□□, quod in antiquioribus translationibus nomine *propositum* vel *delectus* exhibebatur.
[2] Vat. cum cod. cc *licet*. Paulo ante cod. C *daturus* loco *mensus*.
[3] Vers. 15.
[4] Plura vide infra d. 44. dub. 3, ubi et de B. V. Maria, et III. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3.
[5] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quod* loco *quia*. Paulo infra post *dulcissima* in cod. H additur *plena gratiae, quae Deum genuit et hominem*.
[6] Cod. Y *pervenerit*, qui et mox *duplex* ponit loco *dupliciter*.
[7] Antiqui codd. cum ed. 1 *quae* loco *qui*. Paulo ante aliqui codd. ut H M P Q T cum ed. 1 post *vero* addunt *est*, pauci vero ut V X *ut*.
[8] Matth. 22, 37, et Marc. 12, 30.
[9] Codd. aa bb adiungunt *illuminari*.
[10] Vat. cum cod. cc *angustant*.
[11] Supra q. 2. ad 4. — Mox cod. 1 *nec* pro *non*, et cod. Y *ut* loco *quod*.
[12] Vat. addit *id est*, cod. cc *et*, sed antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt quamlibet particulam. Paulo ante in cod. S post *habet* additur *a parte*, in qua additione decidit certe *sua*.
[13] Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic a Vat. additum *caritatis*.
[14] Cod. T *nec ad illud mensuratur nec*; aliqui codd. ut A S V X cum ed. 1 perperam post *mensuram* adiiciunt *nec*.

[1] Some codices, such as X and Y, have *twofold* [duplex] for *in a twofold manner* [dupliciter]. A little before this edition 1 has *its standing still* [huius status] for *a standing still of this kind* [huiusmodi status]. On the following division of operative virtue, cf. Aristotle, Greater Morals, Bk. I, ch. 16 (ch. 17), where it concerns □□□□□□□□□, which in the more ancient translations was exhibited with the noun *design* [propositum] and/or *choice* [delectus].
[2] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, reads *though* [licet]. A little before this codex C reads *is going to give to man* [daturus est Deus homini].
[3] Verse 15.
[4] See more on this below in d. 44, dubium 3, where (the Seraphic Doctor also speaks) of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and in Bk. III, d. 13, a. 1, q. 3.
[5] Out of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *that* [quod] for *because* [quia]. A little below this after *Most Sweet Mother* [Mater dulcissima], in codex H there is added *fully of grace, who begot (Him) God and man* [plena gratiae, quae Deum genuit et hominem].
[6] Codex Y reads *it will have arrived* [pervenerit], which also next puts *twofold* [duplex] in place of *in a twofold manner* [dupliciter].
[7] The ancient codices, together with edition 1, have *which (things)* [quae] in place of *which (acts)* [qui]. A little before this some codices, such as H M P Q and T, together with edition 1, add *it is* [est] after *however* [vero], but a few, such as V and X, add *such as* [ut] for the implicit *(it is)*.
[8] Mt. 22:37, and Mk. 12:30.
[9] Codices aa and bb read *it has a 'being illuminated' that has stood still* [statum illuminari habeat].
[10] The Vatican edition together with edition cc read *constrain* [angustant].
[11] Above in q. 2, in reply to n. 4. — Next codex 1 reads *neither* [nec] for *not* [non], and codex Y *as* [ut] in place of *which* [quod].
[12] The Vatican edition adds *that is* [id est], codex cc *and* [et], but the more ancient codices, together with edition 1 omit either conjunction. A little before this in codex S after *has* [habet] there is adds *on (its) part* [a parte], in which addition there has certainly fallen away *its* [sua].
[13] Trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged the *of charity* here added by the Vatican edition.
[14] Codex T reads *nor is it measured according to It nor* [nec ad illud mensuratur nec]; some codices, such as A S V and X, together with edition 1, faultily add *neither* [nec] after *measure* [mensuram].

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SCHOLION.

I. Hanc quaestionem S. Thom. aliter in

SCHOLIUM

I. St. Thomas seems to solve this question in

Comment. hic q. 2. a. 4, aliter in Sum. II. II. q. 24. a. 7 solvere videtur. Nihilominus Caietanus ad loc. cit. recte asserit, quod « littera (S.Thomae) aliud in superficie prae se fert, et aliud in veritate docet », eiusque verba in hunc sensum explicat, quod tantum loquatur de caritate viae, de qua non potest esse dubium. Haeresis enim Beguardorum asserentium, talem in hac vita gradum perfectinis posse acquiri, ut aliquis in gratia seu caritate non possit amplius proficere, damnata est a Clemente V. in Concilio Viennensi (Clement. tit. de haereticis, cap., Ad nostram). Alibi vero S. Thom. (S. III. q. 7. a. 9. 11. 12.) sententiam communem docere videtur. Quod enim ibi (a. 9.) affirmat de Christo, animam eius habuisse summum gradum gratiae secundum quanitatem intensivam etc.; satis ostendit, non dissentire eum a S. Bonav., qui (hic dub. 1.) de Christo idem profitetur cum communi meliorum Scholasticorum sententia, cui Durand. aliique pauci contradicunt.

one manner in his Commentary, here in q. 2, a. 4, and in another manner in his Summa., II II, q. 24, a. 7. Nevertheless Cajetan on this cited passage rightly asserts, that « the text (of St. Thomas) exhibits one (understanding) on it surface, and in truth teaches another », and he explains his words in this sense, that he only speaks of the charity of the wayfarer (caritate viae), of which there can be no doubt. For the heresy of the Beghards, who asserted that one can acquire such a grade of perfection in this life, that anyone can make no more progress in grace or charity, has been condemned by Pope Clement V, in the Council of Vienne (PP. Clement, On Heretics, chapter "To Our"). But elsewhere St. Thomas (Summa., III q. 7, articles 7, 9, and 11) seems to teach the common sentence. For because he there (in a. 9) affirms of Christ, that His soul had the highest grade of grace according to intensive quantity etc., he sufficiently shows, that he does not dissent from St. Bonaventure, who (here in dubium 1) professes the same of Christ together with the sentence of the better Scholastics, which Durandus and a few others contradict.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 5. 6. — Scot., in utroque scripto III. Sent. d. 13. q. 1. 2. 3. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 44. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4. (qui expresse sententiam S. Bonaventurae dicit esse « planiorem atque communiorem »). — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 22. — Durand., hic q. 9. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 8. — Biel, hic q. 8.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 21, m. 3, a. 5 and 6. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in each version, Sent., Bk. III, d. 13, qq. 1, 2, and 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Sent., Bk. I, d. 44, a. 5. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 4. (who expressly says that the sentence of St. Bonaventure is « the more plain and more common »). — Richard of Middleton., here in a. 2, q. 4. — Giles the Roman, here in 1st. princ., q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals., 5, q. 22. — Durandus, here in q. 9. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 8. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 8.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII.

PARS II.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVII

PART II

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 318-319.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 318-319.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Dub. I.

In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit, quod *Christo non ad mensuram datus est Spiritus*. Videtur enim falsum, quia omne finitum habet mensuram: ergo si Christo datus est Spiritus non ad mensuram, Christo datus est Spiritus infinitus. Sed contra hoc est, quod omnia creata sunt finitae capacitatis.

Respondeo: Hoc infra melius patebit,[1] nunc tantummodo sufficiat, quod hoc vel est dictum propter gratiam *unionis*, quae fecit, quod omnia quae Dei sunt, sint illius hominis; vel propter gratiam *capitis*, quia in Christo est gratia ad omnes actus non arctata, sicut in capite vigent omnes sensus. Unde illa determinatio non privat finitatem, sed privat determinationem ad aliquem actum sive speciale donum.[2]

Doubt I

In this part occur [incidunt] the doubts on the text (of Master Peter's second part), and the first concerns this which he says, that *to Christ the Spirit has not been given according to a measure*. For its seems false, because every finite (thing) has a measure: therefore if the Holy Spirit has not been given to Christ according to a measure, the Infinite Spirit has been given to Christ. But against this is, that all created (things) are of a finite capacity.

I respond: This will be more clear below,[1] now it just suffices, that this has either been said on account of the grace of *union*, which caused, that all those which belong to God, to belong to that Man; and/or on account of the grace of *the Head*, because in Christ the grace for all acts has not been constrained, just as in (one's) head live [vigent] all the senses. Whence that determination does not deprive (the Man) of finiteness, but deprives the determination according to some act or special gift.[2]

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus, quod *caritas est animi nostri rectissima*

Doubt II

Likewise is asked of this which (St.) Augustine says, that *charity is the most*

affectio. Videtur enim male dicere, quia nullus habitus est affectio; caritas est virtus et ita habitus: ergo non est affectio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod affectio dicitur quadrupliciter: uno modo ipsa *vis* affectiva, alio modo dicitur affectio *passio* vis affectivae, ut gaudium et dolor et huiusmodi; tertio modo dicitur *actus* potentiae affectivae;[3] quarto modo dicitur *habitus* affectivus, sicut intellectus uno modo dicitur habitus principiorum, qui[4] est regula intellectus: et hoc modo accipitur, cum dicitur, quod caritas est affectio; et similiter accipit Bernardus,[5] cum dicit, quod virtus est affectio ordinata.

upright affection of our spirit. For it seems that he speaks badly, because no habit is an affection; charity is a virtue and thus a habit: therefore it is not an affection.

I respond: It must be said, that affection is said in a fourfold manner: in one manner as the affective *force* itself, in another manner affection is said (to be) the *passion* of the affective force, as (is) joy and sorrow and (passions) of this king; in a third manner it is said (to be) the *act* of the affective power;[3] in a fourth manner it is said (to be) the affective *habit*, just as 'understanding' [intellectus] is in one manner said (to be) the habit of principles, which[4] is the rule of the intellect [regula intellectus]: and in this manner it is accepted, when there is said, that charity is an affection, and in a similar manner does (St.) Bernard[5] accept (it), when he says, that virtue is an ordinate affection.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod *caritas intus operatur alios actus atque motus, mediantibus aliis virtutibus*. Videtur enim dicere contra illud quod dicitur ad Galatas quinto:[6] *Fides per dilectionem operatur*.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quamvis illud possit sustineri, quod caritas operatur mediantibus aliis virtutibus tanquam ministris, et aliae nihilominus per caritatem adiuvantem et dirigentem; tamen solutio Magistri, quam hic facit, non valet, quia Magister petit principium in solvendo. Supponit enim in solutione oppositum eius quod probatur. Cum enim Spiritus sanctus non efficiat in nobis opera aliarum virtutum sine habitibus mediis, quomodo efficit in nobis opus dilectionis? *Si tu dicas*, quod ipse dilectio est, similiter possum dicere, quod Filius est Sapientia et Verbum, ergo pari ratione sine habitu medio debet illuminare intellectum. Et propter hoc Magistri opinio non est ita[7] probabilis nec quantum ad rationes nec quantum ad auctoritates. Quod patet, si attendantur praedictae solutiones. In omnibus enim solutionibus Magister petit quod est in principio.[8]

Doubt III

Likewise is asked of this which Master (Peter) says, that *charity works the other acts and movements within, by means of the other virtues*. For he seems to speak against that which is said in the fifth (chapter of the Letter of St. Paul) to the Galatians:[6] *Faith works through charity*.

I respond: It must be said, that although it can be sustained, that charity works by means of the other virtues as (its) ministers, nevertheless the others (are) also through helping and directing charity; yet the solution of Master (Peter), which he makes here, is not valid, because Master (Peter) seeks the principle (of his argument) in solving (it). For he supposes in the solution the opposite of that which he proves. For since the Holy Spirit does not effect in us the works of the other virtues without median habits, in what manner does He effect in us the work of love [opus dilectionis]? *If you say*, that He Himself is Love, similarly I can say, that the Son is Wisdom and the Word, therefore for an equal reason without a middle habit He ought to illuminated the intellect. And on this account the opinion of Master (Peter) is thus[7] not probable neither as much as regards (its) reasons nor as much as regards (its) authorities. Which is clear, if the aforesaid solutions are attended to. For

in all the solutions Master (Peter) seeks what is in the principle (of his argument).[8]

[1] Libr. III. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. — Mox ex mss. adiecimus *nunc*, cui cod. Y addit *hoc*.
[2] Vat. cum cod. cc *bonum*, sed contra alios codd. et edd. 1, 3.
[3] Cod. M *actus affectivus*.
[4] Plures codd. cum Vat. ponunt *et* loco *qui*, alii omitunt *qui*, alii ut H T V Y cum ed. 1 exhibent lectionem in textum receptum.
[5] De Gratia et lib. arb. c. 6. n. 17: Ut nihil aliud sint virtutes nisi ordinatae affectiones.
[6] Vers. 6, ubi Vulgata: Fides, quae per caritatem operatur. — Paulo ante in textu Magistri plures codd. ut A G I K T etc. omittunt *mediantibus*.
[7] Cod. X omittit *ita*, qui et paulo ante cum uno alterove cod. ut V habet *ideo* loco *propter hoc*. Mox aliqui codd. ut S T post secundum *nec* omittunt minus bene *quantum ad*.
[8] Ultimam propositionem *In omnibus* etc. supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. — Solutiones Magistri vide hic in lit. c. 6, et hic p. I. q. 1.

[1] Sent., Bk. III, d. 13, a. 1. — Next from the manuscripts, we have inserted *now* [nunc], to which codex Y adds (the explicit) *this* [hoc] (for the implicit *it*).
[2] The Vatican edition together with codex cc reads *or special good* [sive speciale bonum], but contrary to the other codices and to editions 1 and 3.
[3] Codex M has *the affective act* [actus affectivus].
[4] Very many codices, together with the Vatican edition put *and* [et] in place of *which* [qui], the other omits *which* [qui], others, such as H T V and Y, together with edition 1, exhibit the reading received in the text.
[5] On Grace and the Free Will, ch. 6, n. 17: So that the virtues are nothing else but ordinate affections.
[6] Verse 6, where the Vulgate reads: Faith, which works through charity. — A little before this, in the text of Master (Peter), very many codices, such as A G I K T etc., omits *means of* [mediantibus].
[7] Codex X omits *thus* [ita], which also a little before this with one or the other codex, such as V, has *for that reason* [ideo] in place of *on this account* [propter hoc]. Next some codices, such as S and T, after *nor* [the second *nec* in the Latin text], omit less well *as much as regards* [quantum ad].
[8] The last proposition, *For in all* etc., we have supplied out of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1. — See the solutions presented by Master (Peter) here in his text, ch. 6, and in (St. Bonaventure's Commentaries), p. I, q. 1.

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Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Spiritus sanctus non dividitur*. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia Numerorum undecimo[1] dicitur, quod Dominus dixit Moysi: *Auferam de spiritu tuo* etc. *Item*, primae Ioannis quarto:[2] *De Spiritu suo dedit nobis*; si dedit de Spiritu, videtur, quod vel totum dedit, vel divisit in partes.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Spiritus sanctus est in semetipso simplex et ideo in se indivisus; sed in effectibus est multiplex, et ideo quantum ad effectum dividitur, quia non datur singulis ad omnia. Et hinc est — quia[3] plenius datus est Moysi quam aliis — quod ideo dicit: *Auferam de spiritu tuo*; et quia non ad omnia datur nobis, ideo dicit beatus Ioannes: *De Spiritu suo dedit nobis*.

Doubt IV

Likewise is asked of this which (Master Peter) says, that *the Holy Spirit is not divided*. For it seems that he says (something) false, because in the eleventh (chapter) of Numbers there is said, that the Lord said to Moses: *I shall take from thy spirit* etc. *Likewise*, in the fourth (chapter) of the First (Letter of St.) John: *Of His Spirit He has given us*; if He have of the Spirit, it seems, that either He gave the whole, and/or He divided (Him) in parts.

I respond: It must be said, that the Holy Spirit is in His very Self simple and for that reason in Himself undivided; but in (His) effects He is manifold, and for that reason as much as regards effect He is divided, because He is not given to each one [singulis] according to all (His gifts). And hence it is — because[3] He was given more fully to Moses than to others — that for that reason He says: *I shall take from thy spirit*;

and because He is not given to us according to all (His gifts), for that reason blessed John (says): *Of His Spirit he has given us*.

[1] Vers. 17.
[2] Vers. 13.
[3] Plurimi codd. cum Vat. *quod* loco *quia*, sed minus clare et distincte, ideo sequimur ed. 1; cod. X vero habet *quod quia*, ex quo omisso ceterorum codd. explicari potest. Mox post *aliis* codd. dissentiunt inter se; alii cum Vat. ponunt *et quod ideo*, alii *et ideo*, cod. H *ideo quod*, cod. F *ideo dicit*, sed maior pars codd. ut G I K T V W X etc. cum ed. 1 exhibet textum nostrum. Ratio huius dissensionis videtur fuisse in eo, quod paulo ante plurimi codd., uti diximus, *quod* loco *quia* posuerunt. Cfr. d. 18. dub. 6.

[1] Verse 17.
[2] Verse 13.
[3] Very many codices, together with the Vatican edition, have *that* [quod] for *because* [quia], but less clearly and distinctly, and for that reason we follow edition 1; codex X, however, has *that because* [quod quia], which can be explained as missing from all the other codices. Next after *to others* [aliis], the codices dissent among themselves; some with the Vatican edition put *and because for that reason* [et quod ideo], others *and for that reason* [et ideo], codex H *for the reason that* [ideo quod], codex F *for that reason He says* [ideo dicit], but a greater part of the codices, such as G I K T V W X etc., together with edition 1, exhibit our text. The reason for this disagreement seems to have been in this, that a little before this very many codices, as we have said, put *that* [quod] in place of *because* [quia]. Cf. d. 18, dubium 6.